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North korea 93 6 North Korea In war, there is no substitute for victory. —Douglas MacArthur the Big picture President Harry S. Truman was a confident, outgoing individual, but by the end of June 1950 he was described as walking “with the weary man’s heavy tread.” Every morning Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Omar Bradley briefed him on the continuing withdrawals of American and South Korean units. Truman had informed the National Security Council (NSC) on 29 June that the objectives in Korea were “to restore peace there and to restore the border.” In the face of the onslaught from the north, however, those two objectives seemed far from achievable. Although those goals were consistent with those established by the UN, not everyone agreed with them, or at least not with the second part. One of the notable dissenters was Gen. Dwight Eisenhower. In his opinion, the North Koreans had to be defeated “soundly.” The North Korean army could not be allowed to withdraw behind the 38th parallel, where it could regroup with impunity. In mid-July MacArthur himself had let it be known that “I may need to occupy all of North Korea.” He and Eisenhower were not the only ones thinking of that possible necessity. Indeed, in a conversation with Secretary of State Acheson and the Joint Chiefs on 26 June, in response to a query from air force chief of staff Hoyt Vandenberg, the president had replied that “no action should be taken north of the 38th parallel.” He then added, “not yet.” In response to MacArthur’s concerns about future military operations and the significance of the de facto border between North 93 94 Spare Not the Brave and South Korea, Truman requested on 17 July that the NSC recommend a policy that the president should adopt “after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel.” By 7 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that UN forces must conduct operations “both north and south of the 38th parallel.” There views were incorporated into NSC Report 81/1.1 On 26 September the FEC Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group had begun planning for offensive operations in North Korea. MacArthur was confident that his UN forces held the initiative. He informed the UN that he expected “complete destruction of the enemy and his early capitulation.” He concluded that “the backbone of the North Korean Army has been broken.” To finish off the enemy, he provided specific guidance for another amphibious operation deep in enemy territory to be coupled with a strong ground attack across the 38th parallel. On the ground, Eighth Army was advancing north, and Walker was concerned about an inadvertent meeting between his force and X Corps. He had no desire to get into a battle with friendly forces, so he asked MacArthur to advise him of plans regarding X Corps. In what must have seemed an odd response to an army commander, MacArthur replied that X Corps “will remain in GHQ reserve . . . prepared to execute a GHQ-directed operation of which you will be apprised at an early date.” In effect, the Eighth Army commander had no need to know yet what was being planned.2 MacArthur’s landing at Inchon, Walker’s breakout from Pusan, and the disintegration of North Korean resistance put great pressure on the Truman administration to decide what instructions to provide the UN commander as his forces approached the 38th parallel. On 27 September army G-3 Maj. Gen. Charles Bolté informed army chief of staff Collins that “it is a matter of military urgency that the commander of the United Nations forces be given authority to cross this [38th] parallel to accomplish attainment of his military objective.” That same day the Joint Chiefs issued instructions to MacArthur regarding future operations, but they stated therein that “these instructions, however, cannot be considered to be final since they may require modification in accordance with developments.” The mission was clear: “Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces.” The instructions authorized him to “conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th parallel in Korea”; however, it was not a carte blanche authorization. There was a significant caveat: “provided that at the time of such operation there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in...

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