Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-1914

Preface

Preface Between 1908 and 1914, Montenegro, the tiny Serb land nestled in the southwestern corner of present-day Yugoslavia, was a mouse that roared repeatedly in European affairs. A p~:JOr country whose capital was smaller than many backwater European towns, it was constantly involved in diplomatic crises, many of its own making. "On the map she looks like a mere pin head," remarked one author in discussing Montenegro's past glories. "But the point to that pin became an unendurable irritation in Turkey's side and helped to save Europe from entire domination by the Orient."J In time, however , Montenegro became a source of never-ending irritation for the same Europe she had helped save. In 1912, she struck a final blow against Turkey, initiating the First Balkan War. On other occasions , some thought that she might provide the casus belli for a much wider conflict. In his excellent history of the Balkans since 1453, L. S. Stavrianos acknowledged that "the role of Montenegro in South Slav and general Balkan affairs was quite out of proportion to her ridiculously meager material resources.,,2 Yet despite the voluminous literature on European diplomacy before the First World War, consideration of Montenegro and her relations with the Great Powers has generally been cursory, often colored by national passions and personal prejudice. Even sober inquiries into the nature of Europe 's powder keg have frequently sidestepped Montenegro in order to tackle the seemingly more substantive and controversial case of Serbia. In his detailed study of the origins of the First World War, for example, Sidney Bradshaw Fay dismissed Montenegro in a single sentence, contributing to the myth that she was a negligible quantity.3 This study takes a fresh look at the unstable corner of the world where the war began, focusing on Montenegro's relationship with Austria-Hungary and shedding light on many related issues. Montenegro was an important chess piece in matches between Vienna and St. Petersburg for hegemony in the Balkans and between Vienna and Rome for dominance in the Adriatic . Montenegro's actions, interests, and demands often frustrated the cooperative efforts of the Powers to keep the IX Preface peace, challenged the cohesion of the Triple Entente, and exposed the vulnerability of the ostensibly sturdier Triple Alliance. Montenegro's prince and later king, Nicholas I, boldly used the Powers in games of his own and was especially fond of pitting Austria and Russia against one another. In turn, he was often a prisoner of his subjects' strident nationalism in dealings with Austria-Hungary and other states. Austro-Montenegrin relations consisted of a series of crises and rapprochements, each crisis seemingly greater and more dangerous than the last. Opportunities for peace and friendship periodically presented themselves but were allowed to pass. Austria, whose Balkan policies have been indicted for causing war in 1914, often handled the temperamental Montenegrin ruler and his subjects with insensitive arrogance. Montenegro, whose almost comic penury gave inspiration to Franz Lehar's operetta The Merry Widow, strove to fill her empty coffers and extend her frontiers, in the process provoking and antagonizing her much larger neighbor. As it happened, Austria and Serbia started the dominoes falling in 1914, but on several occasions before the July crisis, many people believed that a confrontation between the Dual Monarchy and Montenegro might set Europe ablaze. This study disputes a commonly held view that Montenegro was merely the handmaiden of Serbia and Russia in their struggles with Austria-Hungary-or, as the fiery chief of the Habsburg general staff once called her, "a trimmer of Serbia in the service of Russia."4 In pursuing his own goals, Nicholas frequently crossed swords with Belgrade and St. Petersburg. For years, the Montenegrin and Serbian dynasties exchanged epithets with the same vigor with which they purported to champion the cause of a united Serbdom . Similarly, Russia's relations with Nicholas, the man one tsar called his only friend in Europe, sometimes verged on rupture. Montenegro's fluctuating ties with her sister Slav states, despite the fundamental Russophilia and pan-Serbism of her subjects, contributed to and reflected her erratic course and incendiary potentialities in Balkan politics. Ultimately, Nicholas's policies undermined his people's faith in him. This study also takes issue with the contention, revived in recent years by Fritz Fischer and his school, that in the years immediately before the Sarajevo crisis, Germany was always looking for an opportunity to make war. While generally supporting Austriax [18.118.9.7...