The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony: America’s War of Liberation in Canada, 1774–1776

Conclusion: Misinterpretations and Missteps in a War to Spread Democracy

Conclusion Misinterpretations and Missteps in a War to Spread Democracy Indeed there was benevolence in the whole plan of his expedition. It was to be executed not so much by force as by persuasion. | William Smith’s “Oration in Memory of General Richard Montgomery,” 1776 We now have many enemies among us which might have been friends to the cause, had a Committee of sensible men been sent up from the Congress with some money, to regulate the policy of the Country. | George Measam to Alexander McDougall, Montréal, 31 March 1776 In 1776,Congress analyzed the Canadian debacle only in terms of a traditional military campaign, even though they had intentionally launched a revolutionary war in Quebec—a struggle for the will of a people.1 The delegates did not investigate political-diplomatic failures and did not question why Quebec Province failed to follow the course of its southern neighbors. The catastrophic outcome of the northern enterprise originated from much more than short enlistments, smallpox, and a want of silver. The United Colonies launched a liberation campaign with scant Canadian support, then executed it with insufficient energy and means to achieve its objectives. The War of American Independence was in many ways the first modern “revolutionary war”—a conflict in which the population’s support is the“center of gravity” for strategic victory. In such struggles, people naturally fall into three categories: government supporters, rebels and their friends, and a majority who do not particularly care to get involved,being sufficiently satisfied with their lot to avoid “unnecessary”tumult and change.This was the case in the Thirteen Colonies, and in Quebec Province as well.2 Governor Guy Carleton’s administration was backed by a small cadre of outspoken, aggressive Tory seigneurs and officeholders such as William 346 Conclusion Edward Gray,John Fraser,Hertel-de-Rouville,Adam Mabane,Henry Caldwell , and Gabriel-Elzéar Taschereau, and Bishop Briand with his vicars and priests.They were supported by a similarly small number of less zealous but loyalist-inclined individuals who supported the King when called, or after carefully weighing their options.This group included the conservative faction of Canada’s prewar British Party and prominent French-Canadians such as St-Luc de La Corne and Godefroy-de-Tonnancour, as well as a few parish leaders. This progovernment column was a product of Carleton’s long-term strategic plans.When he came to office in the 1760s,Carleton clearly identified the Canadian population as the critical component for provincial security in a potential conflict, imperial or revolutionary. With that vision, he applied governing principles that theoretically were biased toward the colony’s vast “French”majority, culminating in the Quebec Act of 1774. Arguably, his plan had a fundamental flaw: he founded his state structure on a thin aristocratic foundation, at the cost of distancing a loud middle-class faction and many habitants.Yet it is fair to say that in Canada’s revolutionary episode,the clergy and seigneurs delivered on Carleton’s investment, serving as a levee against the flood of popular rebellion,giving the British military time to sweep in and push back the tide before a rebel government could be established.3 At the other end of the spectrum, there were two streams of opposition to the government. Small cells of liberty-minded patriot activists found direct , common cause with the United Colonies on political and ideological grounds.This numerically inconsequential,but economically powerful element included the radical British Party faction —Thomas Walker, James Price, William Haywood, and Zachary Macaulay—and French-born Canadians such as François Cazeau, Christophe Pélissier, and Maurice Desdevens. A more significant anti-administration element came directly from the habitant majority.Thousands of rural Canadiens joined the few hundred British Party radicals when the parishes reacted to the Quebec Act’s government innovations , manifested in local policy and brought to alarming reality as seigneurs visited the parishes to assert new authority under martial law.The habitants’ 1775 rebellions in the Terrebonne region, the Richelieu Valley, Berthier-enhaut , and the Beauce demonstrated their anger and disenchantment with the government. Independently, these two marginal or fleeting currents of opposition—the Continental patriot movement and the provincial resistance to the Quebec Act government—probably were manageable for the administration .The real danger to the Crown came when they converged, became Conclusion 347 intertwined, and fed each other—especially in the Richelieu Valley, but also...