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BELEAGUERED I have a lot of problems on my shoulders but, strangely enough, I feel better as they pile up. My main concern is propping up the people around me who tend to panic (and who might possibly have a better picture of the situation than I do!). DIARY, JULY 31, 1980 The reaction of the Iranians to the rescue mission was mixed. At first, they were confused and frightened about the nature of the American military presence in their country. Then the officials claimed that, in some way, they had repulsed our forces. But soon they had to admit that no alarm had been sounded anywhere in Iran until we had announced that the operation was over. This realization caused the different leaders in Iran to blame each other for the failure to detect so large a military force. The final and prevailing reaction of the Iranians was to claim a great victory over the United States; the embarrassing photographs of our damaged aircraft were vivid evidence to back their claim. I certainly took no pleasure or amusement in this, although I hoped that their emphasis on our failure would help prevent any further harm to the hostages. Later I learned from some of them that the raid had frightened their guards into treating them better—one consolation. After the captive Americans were dispersed to several secret locations, they were kept under heavy guard and also moved from place to place in order to keep them concealed from us. Even with a maximum intelligence effort, there was no way to tell exactly where all of them were. Now the Iranians were in the throes of choosing their public officials and trying to form a government. With little previous experience in democratic processes, they went through a series of elections, including 533 multiple runoffs for the members of parliament, subsequent elections for a speaker, and then the nomination and ultimate election of a prime minister. Both Khomeini and Bani-Sadr had announced that the majlis would make the final decision on what to do with the imprisoned Americans, and I waited from week to week, observing their political comedy of errors with impatience and chagrin. For a while, Bani-Sadr and I had the same goal—to avoid any further direct confrontation between our two countries. I did not wish the nervous Iranians to kill the hostages, and we both wanted an end to Iran’s tedious election process. During a White House briefing for community leaders on April 30, a visitor asked a pertinent question: “Mr. President . . . in view of the most recent developments in Iran, is there a chance that the people can see you, that you can be with them and you can get out in the countryside , you can get out in the States and be with us?” It was time for me to give the answer which my aides and I had been discussing for a long time. I replied, “Yes,” and explained that although extraordinary circumstances had demanded my presence in the White House and still required most of my time, many of my responsibilities had been alleviated. I would always keep before the American people the plight of the hostages, but a rescue attempt, although unsuccessful, had been completed; our allies were giving us better support with Iran; the sanctions against the Soviet invaders had been defined; our anti-inflation proposals were being favorably considered by Congress; and I believed we would soon have a comprehensive energy policy for our country. I added, “None of these challenges are completely overcome, but I believe they are manageable enough for me to leave the White House for a limited travel schedule.” From this remark, some news reporters claimed that I now thought the hostage situation was manageable. If anyone knew how difficult it was to manage, I did. Although I actually traveled very little, it was a relief to know that I was no longer constrained to stay so close to Washington. I had worked out with my security advisers the procedures and placement of forces to meet any foreseeable development in Iran. But I hoped that my announcing a more normal schedule would help to relieve tension and might contribute to an expeditious decision by the Iranian parliament to 534 IRAN AND THE LAST YEAR [3.149.250.1] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 07:44 GMT) release the Americans. Also, as the question indicated, I needed to have more direct contact with the...

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