Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President

Iran

IRAN We have no intention, neither ability nor desire, to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. NEWS CONFERENCE, JANUARY 17, 1979 On the south lawn of the White House, I stood and wept. Tears were streaming down the faces of more than two hundred members of the press. It was a memorable moment. In the distance we could hear the faint but unmistakable sounds of a mob, shouting at the mounted police who had just released canisters of tear gas to disperse them. Unfortunately, an ill wind seemed to have been blowing directly toward us as we greeted the leader of Iran, and the gas fumes had engulfed us all. With the television cameras focused on me as I welcomed the Shah to our country, I tried to pretend that nothing was wrong. So, with difficulty , I refrained from rubbing my eyes and avoided the extreme irritation that a‹icted most of the others. The Shah and his wife, Farah, were deeply embarrassed, and apologized several times to Rosalynn and me for having been the object of the Iranian student demonstrations. We reassured them, pointing out that the situation seemed to be under control and no harm had been done. That day—November 15, 1977—was an augury. The tear gas had created the semblance of grief. Almost two years later, and for fourteen months afterward, there would be real grief in our country because of Iran. The Iranian ruler, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi, tolerated little political opposition at home, but allegations were increasingly heard in the United States that his secret police, SAVAK, was brutalizing Iranian citizens. Public demonstrations had taken place here against the Shah. As 441 his arrival date approached, extraordinary precautions had been taken to protect him against violence or embarrassment. Every person who entered the White House grounds had been checked carefully, and the District of Columbia and U.S. Park Service mounted police were directed to keep the chanting demonstrators at a safe distance from the welcoming crowd. After a brief ceremony, the Shah and I moved into the White House for a presentation of Iran’s Bicentennial gift to the United States—a remarkable tapestry portrait of George Washington. Then we walked to the Cabinet Room to begin our official discussions. The Shah was a likable man—erect without being pompous, seemingly calm and self-assured in spite of the tear-gas incident, and surprisingly modest in demeanor. The air of reticence in his first conversations with me could not have been caused by his unfamiliarity with American Presidents. Since he had met with President Franklin Roosevelt in Tehran in 1943, he had been a frequent visitor to the White House. I was the eighth American President he had known! A much warmer atmosphere now prevailed than when we had first communicated a few months earlier. 442 IRAN AND THE LAST YEAR Affected by tear gas during the welcoming ceremony for the Shah of Iran and his wife, Farah, November 15, 1977 The Shah of Iran sent an angry message to me . . . that because of the one-month delay in presenting the AWACS proposal to Congress, he was thinking about withdrawing his letter of intent to purchase these planes from the United States. I don’t care whether he buys them from us or not. DIARY, JULY 31, 1977 So read my first diary entry about Iran and the Shah. I was attempting to reduce the sale of offensive weapons throughout the world, but it was not possible to make excessively abrupt changes in current practices, because of contracts already in existence. The Shah had previously ordered a system of ground-based fixed radar stations, to be located around the land borders of Iran for detecting enemy planes and for directing Iran’s air defense forces. I felt that it would be less expensive and more effective to replace them with AWACS (aircraft warning and control systems), which could be obtained either from us or from European suppliers. I had submitted the proposed sale to Congress on July 7, 1977, but the House International Relations Committee had rejected it on the grounds that the security of advanced electronic devices could not be assured in Iran. I then had to withdraw the proposal to prevent its final rejection by Congress. The Shah considered this delay an insult to Iran, and it precipitated his irate message. As he habitually bought military equipment...