An Integrative Habit of Mind: John Henry Newman on the Path to Wisdom

1—Broadening Horizons

—— ChapterOne —— Broadening Horizons 6 “We see but in part, and we know but in part, and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right from our partial views. This might instruct the proudest esteemer of his own parts, how useful it is to talk and consult with others, even such as came short of him in capacity, quickness and penetration: for since no one sees all, and we generally have different prospects of the same thing, according to our different, as i may say, positions to it, it is not incongruous to think nor beneath any man to try whether another may not have notions of things which have escaped him, and which his reason would make use of if they came into his mind.” —John Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding An important feature of an integrative habit of mind entails giving greater attention to the conditions (individual, communal, and environmental ) under which human cognition actually works and to the role that evaluative qualities play in regulating epistemic reflection and conduct. A focus of this sort opens up new possibilities for exploring how processes and practices of intellectual formation enable the cognitive agent both to move from a particular set of claims to a more comprehensive understanding of the relevant issues at hand and to expand intellectual horizons. Broadening horizons in one sense involves highlighting the thick aspects of epistemic reflection and conduct. in another sense, it Broadening Horizons 17 calls for a set of intellectual virtues that enables persons or communities both to engage others from radically different points of view and to acquire a more comprehensive account of the important issues at hand. i will flesh out newman’s overall argument for a thicker yet richer conception of epistemic reflection and conduct. Then i will offer some suggestions as to what a proposal of this sort means for the pursuit of wisdom. included here is a discussion of how a sacramental way of thinking captures the intersection of rigorous reflection and a religious way of being in the world. i will unpack the challenge of navigating epistemic reflection and conduct in a context where people come from radically different perspectives and commitments. i argue that finding viable ways of connecting thick and thin commitments is fundamental to taking up the task of forming an integrative habit of mind. Within a pluralistic context of this sort, a robust account of an integrative habit of mind (instantiated as an embodied particularism of informed judgment ) includes the cultivation of intellectual virtues as indispensable for guiding the process of intellectual exchange. MoVe To THe concreTe in a letter to Father Walford, newman describes the Grammar of Assent as “a conversational essay” and not “a didactic treatise.” it is “a preliminary opening of the ground.” 1 in another letter, newman acknowledges that this work “may be full of defects, and certainly characterized by incompleteness and crudeness, but it is something to have started a problem, and mapped in part a country, if i have done nothing more.” 2 Thinking of the Grammar in this way conveys at least two impressions. on the one hand, newman does not consider its arguments and conclusions to be comprehensive, definitive, or final. After all, the full title of the book is An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, so it seems appropriate to regard the work as a conversational piece or as a preliminary investigation. on the other hand, the structure, arguments, and content of the Grammar call for a closer look at the actual processes of beliefand agent-formation. Although the Grammar fleshes out the conditions under which a religious belief—along with other beliefs (such as belief in the existence of the external world)—is phenomenologically and epistemically rational, it also maps out a proposal about how inquiries ought to be conducted. 18 A N I N T E G R AT I V E H A b I T o f M I N d Along these lines, on the title page of the Grammar newman includes a quotation from Ambrose’s De Fide ad Gratianum Augustum: “non in dialectica complacuit deo salvum facere populum suum” (it did not please God to save his people by means of logic). The Grammar is not, technically speaking, an exegesis of De Fide ad Gratianum Augustum. 3 rather, the Ambrosian line captures a pervasive theme in newman’s thinking about...