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C h a p t e r S i x Perfect Justice aND DiviNe ProviDeNce At the start of the dialogue, the Athenian Stranger and Kleinias agree that divine law is the law that aims at the highest end. They say that correct law must aim at the whole of virtue and at the human goods that together with virtue bring happiness to individual citizens and harmony to the city as a whole. But at the end of the dialogue, the Athenian Stranger says that the laws that they have just outlined, the best possible laws, fail to aim at the highest end. Instead of achieving their goal, the laws “wander” (Laws 962c–d). The laws, he says, are unstable because they aim at a multitude of virtues rather than at virtue as a whole (Laws 962c–d). This is not surprising to those who reflect on the discussion of courage and moderation that is described in Books VII and VIII. In Book VII, we find that young citizens must follow an inflexible regimen in order to resist fear and to develop the disposition that is called “courage.” And in Book VIII we find that this courage is bound to awaken an erotic love that threatens the rule of law and the steady virtues that it promotes. In order to curb the dangerous erotic passions, the legislator must persuade young citizens to regard pleasure itself as a great adversary that must always be conquered in order to do what is just and pious and in order to win honor. It seems that law can promote forms of both courage and moderation, but each of these law-bred virtues requires an inflexibility in regard to the passions that is incompatible with a practical reason that consists in calculating which of our pains and pleasures is best. Yet Kleinias is surprised to hear the Athenian Stranger say in Book XII that the laws fail to aim at a single, coherent goal (Laws 963a). From the beginning of the dialogue, he has believed that he knows what virtue as a whole is. And from the beginning of Book IV, he has believed that the laws that they are outlining will aim at that virtue. Kleinias and the Athenian Stranger say from the start of the dialogue that the whole of virtue includes the four virtues courage, justice, moderation, and practical reason. But they also agree that some say this virtue is the “greatest virtue” and that this virtue is “perfect justice” (Laws 630c, 643e–44a). Perfect Justice aND DiviNe ProviDeNce 135 But precisely what do they mean when they speak about perfect justice ? Why is one virtue, justice, associated with the whole of virtue? And why say that justice rather than some other virtue, such as moderation or practical reason, is the whole of virtue? Moreover, we need to consider what the Athenian Stranger’s remarks near the end of the dialogue about the instability of the laws imply about the law’s attempt to promote perfect justice. Does he mean that the laws try but fail to promote perfect justice? Or is it that when the laws promote perfect justice, they nonetheless fail to promote virtue as a whole or at what is supposed to accompany that virtue? In order to clarify what he means when he speaks of perfect justice and whether or to what extent the law aims at it, we need to take a closer look at what perfect justice is and at how it is taught. When speaking about justice in Book I, the Athenian Stranger refers to justice in two distinct ways. In one respect, it is said to be the whole of virtue, a virtue that includes within it the other three virtues (Laws 630c). But he also speaks about it as one of the particular virtues, as a virtue that is distinct and separate from courage, moderation, and practical reason. As one of these particular virtues, justice is the disposition to be equitable in regard to property: a person is just if he or she gives and takes what is owed (Laws 632b). But when the Athenian Stranger speaks of “perfect justice,” he is referring to a different disposition of the character. Near the start of the dialogue, the Athenian Stranger and Kleinias agree that law should aim at a kind of virtue that is superior to the martial courage that wins victories in foreign wars and also superior to the self-command that allows...

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