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C  Economically Speaking: George Bush and the Price of Perception  .  James Carville’s ubiquitous slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid,” became the Achilles’ heel of the Bush reelection effort.The Democratic mantra resonated with American voters because of the perceived weakness of the U.S. economy. In  the rhetorical situation Bush found himself in was riddled with difficulties .1 The president faced the arduous task of voyaging between the Scylla of declining economic perceptions and the Charybdis of rising political realities . Presidents governing during economic downturns face one central challenge : they must appear to be aware of and attentive to the electorate’s concerns, while not calling unnecessary or excessive attention to economic conditions. David Demarest, Bush’s director of White House communications , remembers the many difficult conversations he had with the president on this very challenge: “I talked with the president a lot about that quite frequently. That is a very complicated problem! He [Bush] understood quite clearly that the economy was not as bad as people were making it out to be. However, for him to say that made it sound like he is out of touch. And if he said that the economy is really in the pits and ‘I feel your pain’ . . . it exacerbates it.”2 In  President Bush failed to meet this challenge. Bush’s economic rhetoric, throughout his presidency, suffered from a poorly developed sense of ethos on economic issues, a disconnect with current perceptions by voters, and unfavorable framing and priming by the media. This chapter proceeds in three movements: First, a review of literature on issue salience, the media’s impact on voters, and political perception is offered. Next, three key rhetorical texts are examined to form the basis of the rhetorical analysis: the New York Economic Club speech delivered on February , ; the Detroit Economic Club “Agenda for American Renewal” speech delivered on September , ; and the second presidential debate, held on October , , in Richmond, Virginia. These speech texts are chosen for three specific reasons: First, taken together, they offer insight into the linear progression of Bush’s rhetorical decision making. Second, they represent pivotal moments in his economic rhetoric. Third, each speech had a real impact on voter perceptions. Examination of each text will include evaluations of its ideological, personal, and rhetorical constraints, and the rhetorical choices made by George Bush from the available means of persuasion. The chapter concludes with a synthesis of the research data collected and examined. Politics is perception. As this chapter demonstrates, a rhetoric that ignores this axiom fails.     Political scientists have much to say about how and why political actors and voters behave the way they do. The language, inquiry, and measurement of political decision making is of great value to rhetorical analysis because it allows the rhetorician to better understand both the audience’s and the speaker’s motivations, decisions, and actions. Economic Perception There is a widely held notion that presidents who govern during times of economic prosperity are reelected. Much research supports this notion.3 Yet this literature, as Marc Hetherington points out, assumes voters are able to aptly discern for themselves what the state of the economy is. He argues that “in terms of economic voting, voters’ perceptions of economic indicators can be more important than the statistics themselves.”4 Thus, perception, not reality , often determines voter attitudes about the economy. This observation should undergird any discussion of presidential approval. Issue Salience Almost every study of presidential approval is based on how issues affect voters’ attitudes and evaluations.5 It makes sense that certain issues would weigh more heavily in a voter’s evaluation of a president than others. Thus, the salience of an issue largely determines how much it will affect a voter’s view of a decision-maker. Again, perception factors in heavily. Whether or not a constituent’s perception of salience agrees with political realities, it still affects his or her evaluation. George Edwards III explains that most political science studies assume issue salience is a constant variable, when actually it is quite malleable. As voters’ perceptions change, so do their determinations about   [18.191.135.224] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 18:08 GMT) which issues are important to them and which ones are not.6 The rhetorical implications for this phenomenon are important. If what a voter considers to be salient can change, then so must the speaker’s message change in order to meet the “needs” of his...

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