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Rudder’s attack plan for D-Day was definite when the Rangers boarded their troopships in Weymouth Bay on June 1, 1944. He was in command of all Rangers in the invasion, some to land on Omaha Beach and others, four miles west at Pointe du Hoc, considered part of Omaha in the invasion plan. Each Ranger would cross to Normandy in two vessels, going most of the 130 miles in a modified civilian troopship before transferring to a landing craft for the run-in to the beach. The troopships were converted channel steamers, which in peacetime carried tourists from England to the Continent or to the Isle of Man and Ireland. The landing craft were LCAs, the acronym for landing craft, assault. The LCAs and troopships were Royal Navy vessels and operated by British crews. The former channel steamers were often called by their civilian names—Prince Charles, Ben-my-Chree, Prince Baudouin, Prince Leopold, Emperor Javelin, and Amsterdam—and each had been modified to accommodate Commandos in raids along the coast of occupied Europe.1 Rudder had organized the Provisional Ranger Group (PRG) in three task forces. Task Force A, slightly more than 250 men, was three companies (D, E, F, and part of Headquarters Company) of the 2nd Battalion, plus about forty others. Led by Maj. Cleveland A. Lytle, Task Force A would assault Pointe du Hoc from the sea and scale the cliffs to destroy or neutralize its guns, then penetrate inland to block the coastal road. Task Force B, sixty-nine Rangers (C Company of the 2nd Battalion) under Capt. Ralph E. Goranson, would land on the extreme west end of Omaha Beach, go sharply to the right, and climb the ninety-foot bluffs of Pointe de la Percée to destroy two 75 mm guns, several machine guns, and mortars. The 75 mm guns were placed to fire laterally the length of the beach, potentially endangering every man on Omaha Beach. Rudder told Goranson, “You have the toughest goddamn job on the whole beach.”2 Task Force C, about 665 men and the main body of the PRG, was all of Max Schneider’s 5th Battalion plus two companies (A and B) and part of Headquarters Company of the 2nd Battalion, as well as Rudder with his PRG CHAPTER 7 POINTE DU HOC JUNE 6–8, 1944 112 CHAPTER 7 headquarters staff. Where Task Force C would land depended on the success of Lytle’s Task Force A at Pointe du Hoc. If the essential men in Task Force A got up the cliffs by 7:00 am (thirty minutes after the scheduled landing), Task Force C would follow them in. But if Task Force A failed, Task Force C would land on Omaha Beach and fight its way overland to Pointe du Hoc—four to five miles of countryside that, as far as Schneider knew, was swarming with Germans—to knock out the detestable guns and rescue the survivors of Task Force A. Whether Rudder or Schneider would command Task Force C is not clear, but a startling development would set up Schneider as its commanding officer, and he would make his authority an unequivocal fact once they were on the beach. The startling development was that, at almost the last hour, Lytle got drunk, and Rudder threw him out of the Rangers and took his place in command of Task Force A going to Pointe du Hoc. At the moment, this change threatened disaster, but in fact Lytle had changed history for the better. His misconduct and Rudder’s decisive reaction put Rudder and Schneider in command of two major components of the invasion, and they performed brilliantly. The key to success was the adaptability inherent in exhaustive preparation at all levels of Rudder’s command, beginning with the men he selected to become Rangers. They were prepared for the unexpected. LYTLE’S DERELICTION The sequence of events that led to Lytle’s dereliction began a few days earlier when Rudder received unconfirmed information, originating with French civilians, that the guns on Pointe du Hoc had been removed. The French report turned out to be correct, but Rudder had no way to confirm it. After a heavy American bombing attack on April 25, the German garrison had moved the guns about a mile inland and dispersed them along a lane beside an apple orchard. However, aerial photographs indicated the guns were still in place, but the images on film were inconclusive because...

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