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h 143 Luke Bretherton The Duty of Care to Refugees, Christian Cosmopolitanism, and the Hallowing of Bare Life Chapter 7 Introduction Some speculate that one outcome of contemporary globalization is the decline of the nation-state and the emergence of global, postnational forms of citizenship underwritten by human rights and international law. However, attention to the treatment of refugees suggests that, despite the globalization of economies and cultures, nation-states will remain the primary location of political belonging and organization for the foreseeable future. Yet attention to refugees also unveils a deep crisis in the nation-state, especially liberal democratic nation-states, one not brought about by globalization , but arising from the basis of modern sovereignty itself. In contrast to unwarranted accounts of global citizenship, which mask the plight of refugees, and overly protectionist accounts of national politics, which exclude refugees, this article draws on the Christian cosmopolitan tradition, the theology of personhood, and the practice of prayer in order to present a series of responses to the situation of refugees in the contemporary context. The first section critically reviews the debate on how liberal democracies should respond to refugees. The second section, following Georgio Agamben’s characterization of refugees as “bare life,” argues that refugees unveil a deep contradiction in contemporary patterns of political sovereignty. It is this contradiction that makes the current debate on the duty of care to refugees so intractable and 144 Luke Bretherton yet so pressing. The article closes by arguing that while a theological account of political authority points to some roads beyond the crisis, the first task of the church is to properly order its own duty of care to refugees. It concludes with an exegesis of the second clause of the Lord’s Prayer as a way of giving an account of what such care might involve. Theological Politics and the Liberal Democratic Response to Refugees In debates about appropriate ethical and political responses to refugees in liberal democratic polities, three key issues emerge. The first is the very definition of a refugee. The second is whether refugees should receive a priority of attention and resources as compared with the claims of economic migrants. The third is whether governments owe a greater duty of care to existing members than to those who exist beyond its formal boundaries. Directly related to this last issue is the question of whether borders and a defined territory are themselves moral.1 Definitions and the Priority of Refugees There is some debate about how to define who and what is a refugee and how this contrasts with related terms, notably the term “economic migrant.” The most accepted definition is given in the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, which states that a refugee is a person who is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his/ her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself /herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution.2 There are several things to notice about this definition. In the contemporary context the close interrelation between violent political conflict and severe economic and social disruption makes it difficult to distinguish between refugees and economic migrants. Technically , refugees move to save their lives and economic migrants move to improve their economic and social prospects. However, most migration—of which refugees are a subcategory—involves mixed motives stimulated by a variety of economic, social, and political [3.144.36.141] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 08:44 GMT) The Duty of Care to Refugees 145 pull and push factors.3 Yet the UN Convention is specific. As Gil Loescher points out, The key criterion determining refugee status is persecution, which usually means a deliberate act of the government against individuals , and thus excludes victims of general insecurity and oppression or systematic economic deprivation, and people who have not crossed national frontiers to seek refuge.4 Thus a refugee must be outside his or her country of origin and without the protection of one’s government. This excludes internally displaced persons and those moving because of forced migration (either because of social, economic or political disruption or low-intensity conflicts which exacerbate such disruption). The convention is also individualistic in its assumption, requiring that the individual personally must face persecution. For example, someone who moves because of civil war or famine is not covered by the...

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