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12 Improving Programs for Children T he majority of young children in the United States are spending signi- ficant parts of their days in the care of people other than their parents. Bringing these programs and settings up to a level of quality that is good enough to support robust language development for most children has become a national necessity. It is also surprisingly easy. It has been done many times, in many places, using many different strategies. It has been done one center or child-care program at a time, and it has been done on a national scale. Let’s explore some examples. Building Models of Excellence In Allegheny County, PA, a consortium of foundations and public and private agencies took on the challenge of providing early education programs for the vast majority of poor children in their community, programs that would be good enough to enable them to start school on a par with their wealthier peers. Before launching their Early Childhood Initiative, this Pittsburgh-area consortium mapped out the “business case.” Drawing on the research in child development and early learning, they sketched a model program. They figured out what training the teachers would need, what salaries would attract and hold them, what equipment and learning materials would be necessary, and what it would take to create appropriate facilities. They estimated the level of use in their county, figuring that about 80 percent of the low-income families would take advantage of free, high quality early education programs. Then the number crunchers went to work. They calculated that the per-child difference between the state child-care subsidy and the cost of a good program was just $13 a day! Armed with this information, they asked local businesses and philanthropies to join their consortium and help fund the gap. The first Early Childhood Initiative centers opened their doors in 1997. It soon became apparent that the planners had been correct: children were happy and learning. Their parents and teachers were thrilled with their progress. A formal evaluation1 documented that children were gaining Improving Programs for Children 159 about one and half months of development in language and cognitive skills for every month they spent in the program. Children who entered at three were on track to make up their initial deficits and enter school primed for success. The Allegheny County project never reached its goal of making good enough programs the norm for its poor children. Two things stood in its way. First, the planners had underestimated the need. Their planning had been done prior to Welfare Reform; their implementation occurred just when large numbers of former welfare recipients with young children were entering the workforce. The part-day, Head Start-like programs they had planned would have to offer full and even extended day care to accommodate parents’ work schedules. Extended hours, community involvement in planning these new programs, start-up and recruitment delays, and administrative oversight soon pushed the per-child cost to triple the original calculation. The second, unexpected problem was a shortage of public funds. The funders, led by the Heinz Endowments, had made a five-year commitment . Their goal was to demonstrate the success of the experiment and to persuade the state government to create a dedicated funding stream, not just for Allegheny County, but for counties throughout the state that wanted to provide high quality early education to the children who needed it the most. The coalition included powerful business leaders who had the governor’s ear; they and other advocates worked tirelessly and strategically to secure a public commitment. Unfortunately, the initiative planners overestimated their persuasive powers. No amount of documented success or documented need could convince the governor to make early education a top priority, and the legislature was not prepared to push for it without his leadership. In the context of welfare reform, many legislators saw the Allegheny County model as “expensive child care,” rather than as a foundation for lifelong learning. Reluctantly, the coalition scaled back the Initiative after its third year of implementation, when it became clear that public funds would not be forthcoming and the initiative’s ambitious benchmarks could not be met. In the end, Allegheny County got excellent new programs for about 10 percent of the children that they had targeted. The rest remained out of luck. A RAND Corporation study of the Early Childhood Initiative2 called it “a noble bet” and sought explanations for its failure to achieve its program...

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