Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere

3 Subversive Information: The Historical Thrust of Chinese Intelligence

C H A P T E R 3 Subversive Information The Historical Thrust of Chinese Intelligence Ralph D. Sawyer Spying transcends human affairs. Spies must successfully undertake actions beyond the capability of other men. How can their achievements be compared with merely assaulting a city, occupying terrain, capturing an enemy’s flag, or killing a general? Their greatness is incalculable, beyond words. —Shi Zimei F or more than twenty-five-hundred years Chinese intelligence activities have been marked by vibrant theorizing and dedicated practice—the former encompassed within the essentially continuous military writings; the latter implemented throughout the virtually interminable warfare that plagued China, whenever its nominal geopolitical unity was shattered and millenarian movements ravaged the land.1 Internally directed security measures also proliferated in both the fragmented states and overarching dynasties as the emperor and local rulers sought to control not only the populace but also powerful regional factions, royal family members, court minions, and the bureaucracy at large. Surprisingly, rather than being dismissed as relics from an antique age, they continue to be scrutinized by the military institutions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for viable methods and applicable techniques that / 29 / 30 / Ralph D. Sawyer are in accord with the thrust to formulate and excel at a uniquely Chinese way of warfare.2 Spies reportedly assisted the Shang Dynasty in overthrowing the Xia Dynasty; oracular inscriptions indicate that intelligence gathering and reporting date back to the middle Shang (1200 bce), and historical vestiges confirm that agents were employed in the Spring and Autumn Period (722–481), a time when warfare dramatically escalated. Without accurate information of enemy activities, any of the emergent states then increasingly entangled in the era’s multiparty conflict would almost have certainly perished. Battlefield developments and the growing severity of the threat prompted experienced commanders , governmental authorities, and political thinkers to analyze military clashes and ponder collateral diplomatic incidents in a quest to discern replicable patterns and devise essential measures. Unfortunately, the earliest military writings, which were essentially protobooks consisting of often-enigmatic comments written on narrow bamboo strips, now exist only as scattered pronouncements embedded in later works. However, when coupled with fragments preserved in the first historical chronicles, the evolving nature of intelligence activities visible in China’s earliest surviving military treatise—the Art of War, attributed to the infamous Sunzi (referred to as Sun Tze elsewhere in this volume), perhaps the world’s first professional security adviser—becomes apparent.3 The Spring and Autumn Period The dire situation confronting most rulers at the end of the Spring and Autumn Period and the beginning of the aptly named Warring States Period (403–221, during which Qin subjugated the remaining twelve states) prompted Sunzi to commence the Art of War by asserting that ‘‘warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Dao to survival and extinction.’’4 He then appropriately concluded that not only ‘‘must it be pondered and analyzed,’’ but also that it could not be undertaken without detailed planning and a comprehensive analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of both parties. In the world’s first known net assessment procedure, detailed calculations were to be undertaken that comparatively weighed seven major factors: ‘‘Which ruler has the Dao? Which general has greater ability? Who has gained the advantages of Heaven and Earth? Whose laws and orders are more thoroughly implemented? Whose forces are stronger? Whose officers and troops are better trained? Whose rewards and punishments are clearer?’’5 Later writers would expand the list of obligatory categories, but even in the Art of War some forty mutually defined or otherwise interrelated pairs are already apparent, including Heaven/Earth, hunger/satiety, rested/exhausted, ordered/disordered, fearful/confident, and lax/alert. Deciding whether to undertake an expeditionary campaign or engage an enemy in battle therefore became Subversive Information / 31 a question of rationally determining the prospects for victory, all combat being eschewed without certainty that the enemy can be conquered. Furthermore, emotional factors should never become proximate causes for warfare: ‘‘If it is not advantageous, do not move. If objectives cannot be attained, do not employ the army. Unless endangered do not engage in warfare. The ruler cannot mobilize the army out of personal anger. The general cannot engage in battle because of personal frustration. When it is advantageous, move; when not advantageous, stop. Anger can...