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Chapter Eight Taking Leave of the Animal? The Theological and Ethical Implications of Transhuman Projects celia฀deane-drummond In this chapter I focus on the relationship between transhumanism and what might be termed human “animality” or “creatureliness.” I believe that this is important, because taken in isolation the kind of enhancements portrayed by transhuman philosophers might seem relatively innocuous. By drawing particularly on the work of Nick Bostrom, the philosopher and protagonist of transhumanism, I hope to uncover subtle tendencies toward perceiving human development in disembodied terms. This is important for theological anthropology. I argue against any linear historical trajectory from Augustine, through to René Descartes, and from modernity and transhumanism .1 However, I suggest that patterns of relationships in the thought of Augustine, especially stripped of their theological rootedness in an affirmation of creation, expose a detachment from understanding human beings as grounded in solidarity with other animals through common creaturely being. I suggest that this is important ethically in assessing the trajectory of transhumanism, inasmuch as it shapes how we perceive human flourishing that in turn has an impact on how we treat other human beings and other animals. Transhuman Enhancements as Transanimal? The rhetoric associated with transhuman philosophy focuses most commonly on the natural limitations of the human condition and how these might be overcome by various bioengineering technologies. If these are couched in case studies that are illustrative of human suffering and disease, the reader is naturally and readily drawn to sympathize with the use of such technologies. A similar approach may be used in arguments for embryonic stem cell research, for example. The philosopher John Harris argues this case in Enhancing Evolution. At the start of the book he puts the case baldly: “Wouldn’t it be wonderful if we humans could live longer healthier lives 116฀ celia฀deane-drummond with immunity to many of the diseases like cancer and HIV/AIDS that currently beset us? Even more wonderful might be the possibility of increased mental powers, powers of memory, reasoning and concentration, or the possibility of increased physical powers, strength, stamina, endurance, speed of reaction and the like. Wouldn’t it be wonderful?”2 Further, when placed in such a context, the difference between therapy and enhancement evoke a blurred line that is hard to maintain, and that therefore is not necessarily useful in ethical analysis. Any resistance to transhumanism when it is couched in terms of resistance to disease or a healthier life, or increased mental or physical powers, might seem reminiscent of Luddite sensibility. Yet perhaps it is important to reflect a little more carefully on the practical implications of what is being suggested. It might seem wonderful in terms of causing us to be amazed, but would it necessarily always be something that humanity always strives after as a good? Harris believes that hostility toward enhancement is misplaced, comparing such changes with socially accepted enhancements such as wearing glasses and immunization . For him the only ethical quandary here is a balance between risk and benefits—do the benefits outweigh any possible risks that might be present; and if these can be managed, then we should go ahead. He also presses for individual freedom of choice and autonomy as another reason why governments need to back such a shift. Yet Harris goes further than this and presses for such changes as a matter of obligation to create a new human future. In this he perceives enhancements fitting in to a view of what might be broadly termed human “evolution ,” understood as a human construction. He goes as far as to suggest that we need to replace natural selection with deliberate selection and Darwinian evolution with enhancement evolution.3 He believes, therefore, that the potential of humanity can only be reached by taking such deliberate steps, achieved through enhancement technologies. He also reinforces this by suggesting that there was never a time when humans did not try and improve their lot, as “ape-descended” persons.4 Here he seems to be using a naturalistic Darwinian argument, that because even our early ancestors were presumably selected to try and improve their situation, then we should do the same. The difference is that now, according to him, evolution is within our powers to manipulate.5 I suggest that beginning with such an analysis helps to explain the significance of those particular cases of enhancement that seem at first sight to be reasonable and realistic. Bostrom is an atheist philosopher and transhuman activist who, paradoxically perhaps...

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