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I WAS A relatively new PhD working at the University of Kentucky in mid1990 when my telephone rang. It was Marvin Phaup from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Roy Meyers was leaving CBO, and CBO was looking for someone who had an interest in (and could analyze) budget process reform issues. Because my wife had just taken a job in Washington, I was looking to move. Little did I know, even after starting at CBO in 1991, that this phone call would forever change my professional life. I had even less reason to believe that it would lead to this book. In 1996 I left CBO to return to academia, at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. The longer I was away from the agency, the more I itched to tell the story of CBO. It seemed to me (and still does, as you will discover if you read on) that a story of this small institution, trying to be nonpartisan in the middle of the most partisan environment imaginable, was one that needed to be told. Because I had access to a lot of the players, it seemed that I might be able to learn just enough to do the story justice. For a number of years, because of various professional and personal commitments , the itch remained unscratched. After moving to The George Washington University in 1999, however, I began to develop a plan. It involved figuring out what story to tell, figuring out who I needed to talk to, and what other information was needed to tell the story. At the time I had no idea that it would take more than ten years from active planning to final manuscript. Over the course of time the project evolved into more than a history of CBO. The more I got into the research, a chronological history seemed a less effective way to tell the story than to focus on particular functions and events that would illustrate what I think are its main two points. Those points—that objective analysis is important to the effective operation of democracy, and that the capacity to provide such objective analysis is the result of the establishment of a culture that itself results from conscious managerial decisions—are what this book substantiates . In choosing this approach, I necessarily had to leave some things out and fail to highlight other contributions that may seem just as worthy of mention. I am sorry if the specific approach that I took to the story appears to slight any individual or event. This is not my intention or wish—just a by-product of time and page limitations. Acknowledgments x Acknowledgments A project of this magnitude can never be done alone. It is the product of a great deal of support, both intellectual and personal. In this case, however, I add to this the large number of people who were active participants in the process, because they talked to me about it, they agreed to be interviewed both on and off the record, they provided information, they agreed to read sections and comment . It’s not that the book would be lessened without them. Rather, it simply would not exist. For this reason, it is a pleasure to acknowledge their contributions here and to simultaneously absolve them of any responsibility for errors and omissions. First were the six past and former CBO directors interviewed for this book. Alice Rivlin, one of the true giants of American public service, was incredibly generous with her time—agreeing to be interviewed three times. Each of these conversations provided gems of insight that enabled me to more fully understand what had been happening, whether in the initial years of CBO, or in the Clinton White House, or (as she remains incredibly engaged) even in the last year. Bob Reischauer, whose personal devotion to nonpartisan analysis and effective public policy were an inspiration when I worked for him, agreed to talk to me three times as well. Bob was particularly forthcoming in helping me sort out details of the agency’s role in the Clinton health plan. Doug Holtz-Eakin also talked to me three times—once during his tenure as CBO director and twice afterward—and encouraged the project beyond simply filling in details on issues like dynamic scoring and CBO versus the GSEs. Rudy Penner, a crucial figure in fostering the agency’s nonpartisan culture, helped illuminate the mid-1980s, from Gramm-Rudman to the start of the S&L crisis. June O...

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