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For example, as CompStat meetings became ingrained in the organizational culture , lower levels of the NYPD started to employ “mini-CompStats” to consider crime statistics and strategies. One CompStat participant noted, “It became a trickle-down process of thinking because nobody wanted to be embarrassed at the big show.”44 Similarly, in Baltimore, CitiStat meetings have spawned their own “agencystat” meetings to prepare for the grilling they receive.45 While the top-level meeting focuses the attention of senior managers, it is through considerations of data and processes at the agency and subagency levels that learning within a unit or agency takes place.The top-level meetings have three particular advantages over agency-level learning forums. First, they offer a forum to diffuse the lessons that have been developed at lower levels. Second, the inclusion of senior elected officials signals that performance is a serious issue and motivates agency heads. Finally, decisions that significantly affect resources, strategies, and policy can be made quickly because the key players are together. However, much depends on the dedication of senior-level political officials and their willingness to ask management questions. In the absence of political involvement , top-down learning forums such as CitiStat will struggle. In addition, at some point, top-down pressure in the name of accountability will foster defensive reactions, which ultimately weaken a common focus on problem solving and encourage agency staff to circumvent or discredit performance information systems .46 The existence of performance information does not eliminate information asymmetry, as agency staff still have information advantages about how the information was collected and its meaning. To be successful, therefore, the dialogue must retain a basic level of legitimacy. If agency staff see learning forums as exercises in political blame assignment rather than solution seeking, they become disillusioned. The tone of the dialogue shifts from solution seeking to strategic advantage, turning learning forums into sessions where different sides seek to present conflicting accounts of the meaning of performance information. PowerTrac struggled when senior officials sought to use the forums to uncover performance problems, preparing prescripted questions and evidence to embarrass agency staff. As the legitimacy of the dialogue declined, middle- and lower-level managers viewed it as acceptable to collude in evading performance management controls. DeHaven-Smith and Jenne warn: To the extent that administrative discourse is seen as a game of “ gotcha, “ it will reinforce rather than expose and dissolve defensive thinking, and the communicative weakness of performance management will be amplified rather than corrected. Hence, it is essential that inquirement processes be carefully structured to facilitate discursive problem solving, discourage heavy-handed questioning , and respect the dignity of all participants.47 182 Chapter Nine Another way to raise agency defenses is to tie performance assessments closely to budget rewards.This is a key risk for PART. PART offers multiple opportunities for learning forums. It can prompt agencies that receive PART scores to perform a selfevaluation . It can push Congress to consider program quality. However, the only learning forum that the OMB can actually structure is the interaction between the OMB budget examiner and agency representatives. However, because the OMB has the final say on the PART assessment, and there are potentially large consequences arising from the accompanying budget recommendation, there is little possibility of fostering a sense of equality between participants. As the budget process becomes the backdrop of dialogue routines about performance information, this increases the incentive for managers to lose their sense of purpose and to act strategically. Agencies may feel forced to agree with OMB recommendations because they fear reduced budgets and, in turn, may not truly buy into management recommendations , completing those that are easy or with which they agree, while doing little with the others.They will point to results that paint a positive portrait of their programs while discounting, ignoring, and even manipulating other data.48 A GAO observer of the PART process warns that “an overly instrumental view of performance can be problematic. Performance information becomes a gun pointed at people’s head. The integrity of that information becomes questioned and debated. Performance information is not as useful for budget decisions because of all the interests involved and because of the high stakes of the budget process.”The irony is that GPRA, criticized by the OMB for being disconnected from budget decisions, may have been more likely to foster bottom-up learning for that very reason.49 An example of this comes from an effort to use PART to analyze overlapping...

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