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c h a p t e r c h a p t e r 1 Theological Anthropology and Bioethics Roberto Dell’Oro This chapter provides a general framework for understanding the contribution of theological anthropology to bioethics. The underlying presumption is that a theological contribution, in bioethics or any other field, requires of the theologian a personal commitment to a particular faith tradition—Roman Catholic in my case—but also openness to the conditions of universal moral communication beyond the limits of one’s specific theological affiliation. Traditionally, the scientific articulation of moral theology has reflected a twofold concern: one for the internal coherence of the theological system, the other for the integration of new philosophical perspectives, in critical dialogue with both culture and society.1 The success of this methodological program depends, minimally, on two factors: first, a disposition of intellectual generosity on the part of the theologian, namely, his or her willingness to partake in the ongoing reflection of a given community of moral 14 roberto dell’oro discourse, and second, an attitude of active receptivity on the part of the public the theologian is addressing. A disposition to listen is more than a pure theoretical stance, it is a moral attitude, itself defined by openness to the surprise of meaning coming from unsuspected distances. At present, the field of bioethics seems to exhibit a certain resistance to the integration of theological voices, a methodological “closure” of sorts that might appear as both unexpected and startling to an attentive observer of the field’s beginnings.2 Bioethics is a relatively new field of study characterized by an interdisciplinary approach to ethical questions raised by advances in biotechnologies and the life sciences. Because of its inherent complexity, bioethics relies upon the contribution of different points of view on the issues it faces. Thus the interaction of theology, philosophy, sociology, and public policy has contributed to a richer understanding of the implications of medical research for society at large. However, whereas thirty years ago the positive contribution of theologians would have been acknowledged as important,3 it might be met now with an attitude of skeptical resignation. I argue that the “marginalization” of theological voices in the field of bioethics depends on the convergence of two factors involving, respectively, philosophical and theological ethics. Struggling to find a specific methodology for the dialogue across different disciplines, bioethics tends to reduce the contribution of philosophical ethics to the reconstruction of the conditions for moral consensus in society at large. Although bioethics encounters questions of ultimate meaning as it investigates issues such as genetic engineering, assisted reproductive technologies, euthanasia and assisted suicide, to name but a few, it fails to address these questions’ broader ethical significance. Viewing moral pluralism as an obstacle toward the sharing of any “thick” notion of the good within society, bioethics expunges as philosophically uninteresting any attempts to ground such notions on a coherent anthropological basis. In so doing, it replaces questions of moral meaning with questions of procedure and reduces the task of ethics to a logical analysis of moral argumentation, one that functions meaningfully as long as it remains within the framework of a “thin” common morality.4 The distinction between “thin” principles of common morality and “thick” notions of the good in bioethics mimics the wider theoretical strategy pursued by political liberalism. For the latter, ethics cannot rationally justify “ideologies of human fulfillment” with their relative notions of the “good life.” At best, it can provide criteria for the positive interaction of individual autonomous agents within a community of moral discourse. [3.129.195.206] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 15:17 GMT) Theological Anthropology and Bioethics 15 Insofar as those criteria are the result of consensual agreement, they can exert normative force only in relation to the rightness of the actions they prescribe.5 However, the goodness of the ends implicitly pursued by these actions, the kind of moral personalities and moral societies they yield, remain beyond the scope and limits of ethics.6 To such an understanding of the meaning of ethical reflection there corresponds a failure on the part of theological ethics to credibly articulate the public relevance of moral insights grounded in the faith experience of religious communities and traditions.7 Such a failure is particularly visible in the field of bioethics. For here, rather than challenging the prevailing methodological narrowness, theologians either “suspend” their anthropological presuppositions so as to enter the community of moral discourse from a position of neutrality (what...

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