Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Question Two

QUESTION TWO Text of Aristotle: “All men desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us known and brings to light many differences between things.”(Metaphysics I, ch. 1, 980a 23-26). Do all men naturally desire to know? 1 [1] Is this true: “All men naturally desire to know?”1 [Arguments Pro and Con] [For the negative] I prove that it is not true: For if it were, then they would naturally know that they know. The implication is evident, because nothing is desired unless it is known, according to On the Trinity IX, ch. 4.2 2 Also, if this were true, then if the impediment were removed, all would know. The implication is evident in the case of fire, because it naturally is inclined to move upward, and immediately does so if it is outside of its proper place and there is nothing to stop it. 3 Also, if this were true, then no one would have scientific knowledge, or at least if they had it, they would not desire it, since “desire exists only in regard to what is not possessed.”3 4 Also, some want to remain ignorant, because some ignorance is affected. 1 Aristotle, Metaphysics I, ch. 1, 980a 23-26. 2 Augustine, De Trinitate X, ch. 1, n. 3 (PL 42, 974; CCL 50, 315). 3 Cf. Augustine, Enarrat. in psalmos ps. 118, sermo 8, n. 4 (CCL 40, 1688; PL 37, 1522): “Desiderium ergo quid est, nisi rerum absentium concupiscentia”; Sermo 177 (ed. C. Lambot p. 68; PL 38, 956): “Desiderium est dicendum eius rei non quam habent, sed quam volunt habere”. 62 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS 5 [Arguments of Henry of Ghent] Also, there are the arguments of Henry of Ghent in his Summa:4 Nothing is wanted except under the aspect of the good; therefore, appetite is not naturally inclined towards truth. 6 Also, will is distinguished from nature. 7 Also, [each] nature is determined to one single thing; therefore, [the human intellect qua nature] would only wish to know only one thing. 8 [Reply of Henry to the aforesaid arguments] To the first:5 To know is something advantageous to the intellect. 9 To the second,6 this is true of the will insofar as it is free. 10 To the third,7 [the human intellect] is determined to one genus. Just as matter is determined to whatever has the characteristic of a form, so the intellect is with respect to knowing. It is like fire, which is determined to rise in general but not determined to just this single instance. 11 [For the positive] For the contrary view there is the text of the Philosopher.8 [I.—ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PROOF OF ARISTOTLE] 12 [2] Against the proof of the Philosopher9 that we do not love most of all the sense of sight, there is this proof. That sense is most loved the opposite of which we hate most of all, according to the Prior Analytics,10 in chapter [beginning with the words] “When the extremes are converted”, where the last rule states: “That is sought the more whose opposite we shun the more. “But we hate the opposite of touch more than the opposite of vision, because the opposite of touch destroys an animal, but not the opposite of vision; therefore, etc. 4 Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 4, q. 3 (ed. Paris, fol. 31 L). 5 Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 4, q. 3 ad 1 (I fol. 32P,; cf. supra, n. 5. 6 Ibid., ad 4, fol. 32 R; cf. supra, n. 6. 7 Ibid., ad 2, fol. 32 Q; cf. supra, n. 7. 8 Aristotle, Metaphysics I, ch. 1, 980a 21-25. 9 “Signum autem est sensuum dilectio”; cf. preceding note. 10 Aristotle, Prior Analytics II, ch. 22, 68a 25-68b 7. BOOK I QUESTION TWO 63 13 Also, against the statement that vision gives us the greatest knowledge there is what the Philosopher says in On the Senses and the Sensibilia11 about those born blind...