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BOOK V QUESTIONS TWELVE-FOURTEEN 565 QUESTION FOURTEEN Is the same thing referred to two per se? [Arguments Pro and Con] 17 [1] That it is: The same container is related to the many contents, [just as the same number can contain many numbers]. 18 Similarly, one and the same active potency is referred both to acting and to a passive potency. 19 Also, whatever the genus depends upon so also does the species; therefore species is referred to the correlative of the genus and to its own proper [correlative], and to both per se. 20 Also, the species is referred to the genus per se, according to Porphyry,17 and per se to the individuals. The species is what is predicated per se of the individuals. Here individuals are posited and defined through the species, because it [the individual] is not posited there as genus, nor as subject; therefore only as the correlative of the species; therefore, etc. 21 For the opposite, there is what the Philosopher says here in Bk. V,18 where it is regarded as incongruous that the same thing be said twice. [I.—TO THE FOURTEENTH QUESTION A.—SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION] 22 [2] It must be said that the distinction is suitable. Note about the last question [q. 14] that the solution of the others [qq. 12-13] depends upon it—viz. that the same thing cannot be referred to diverse things primarily; it can however be referred per se but not primarily. Because what pertains to something primarily, pertains to it through its species; what pertains to it per se, pertains to i t 17 Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium ch. ‘De specie’, ed. Busse, p. 4, 9-10, AL I6, p. 9. 18 Aristotle, Metaphysics V, ch. 15, 1021a 30-32; for the text of Aristotle, cf. the note attached to n. 31 below. 566 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS through a cause19 in itself. Hence, those are said to be relative primarily which are of this sort through their own specific notion, as a per se father. Other relatives are said per se according to something understood to be in them, as the notion of some generic characteristic, for example, medicine is said relative to the notion of the science, which is its genus, which is understood to be characteristic of it. 23 Proof of the first:20 because if this were so, then that relation which is the reason for referring one to two terms primarily would be two relations essentially. For to two, there is not primarily the same relationship, but a relation as such is a relationship. Also, then the same thing would have two definitions, because through both correlatives it would be defined primarily in equal measure, and then it could be known through one and not known through the other. 24 Also, then the same thing could be and not be simultaneously. I take [for example] two correlatives A and B, and C refers to both. If C refers to A and in an equally primary way to B, since A could exist without B. it would follow that C, relative to both, namely to A and C, would both exist and not exist, if A existed but B were destroyed. 25 Also, it is possible that the same thing be referred to diverse things not primarily, because primarily and per se it is referred to its proper correlative, and per se though not primarily to a correlative of its genus. For example, multiple and submultiple are referred, [e.g.] double and half are referred; but double is referred per se and primarily to half, and per se but not primarily to a submultiple, which is a correlative of its genus. And the fact is that the submultiple—which is the per se, but not the first, correlative of the double,—can exist when the half is non-existent. But the half cannot be if the submultiple is non-existent. 26 But the same thing cannot be referred to any diverse things whatsoever. For if it is referred to one primarily and to the other per se, then it could be that the first is such that it could not exist 19 Cause has the meaning here of a ratio or notion contained in something’s essential or necessary attributes. 20 Namely, that the same thing cannot be referred to diverse things primarily. [18.119.255.94] Project MUSE (2024-04-16 10:11 GMT) BOOK V...

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