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chapter seven The Developmental Theory of Embodiment Niva Piran, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto Tanya Teall, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto Embodiment has been a construct developed and discussed mostly in the disciplines of philosophy and critical sociology. A definition of the construct , rooted in the writings of Merleau-Ponty (1962) and his students, that is in line with this chapter is the “experience of engagement of the body with the world” (Allan, 2005, p. 177). This definition reflects not only the breadth of possible subjectively perceived embodied experiences but also their inextricable connection to social contexts and structures. This chapter aims to describe the potential contribution of the theoretical construct of Embodiment in understanding disordered eating and body weight and shape preoccupation. It also aims to delineate the innovative Developmental Theory of Embodiment (DTE) by Piran and her associates (Piran, Carter, Thompson, & Pajouhandeh, 2002; Piran et al., 2007; Piran, Thompson, Legge, Nagasawa, & Teall, 2009), which is located at the intersection of the disciplines of psychology and sociology. This theory proposes that social experiences shape individuals’ body experiences through three core pathways: experiences in the physical domain, experiences in the mental domain involving exposure to dominant social labels and expectations, and experiences related to social power. The theory further contends that both protective and risk factors are organized along these three pathways, and, hence, in addition to its etiological significance, the theory could guide both therapy and prevention of eating disorders. The chapter is divided into two central parts. The first part, entitled the Embodiment Construct and Its Relevance to Eating Disorders, begins with current delineations of the construct of embodiment within the disciplines of philosophy and critical sociology where it has originated. It then continues 1 6 9 1 7 0 N i v a P i r a n , Ta n y a T e a l l with a discussion of the relevance of this construct to mental health generally and to eating disorders specifically. The second part, entitled The Developmental Theory of Embodiment, describes the research program leading to the emergence and validation of the theory as well as key constructs of the theory. The conclusion section addresses implications of this theory to treatment and prevention. The Embodiment Construct and Its Relevance to Eating Disorders The Embodiment Construct in the Disciplines of Philosophy and Critical Sociology Current descriptions of the construct of embodiment are anchored in the writings of the French phenomenological philosopher Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 281) advanced the understanding of the construct of embodiment by giving rise to the notion of the “lived body” and asserted that consciousness, or human subjectivity, resides in the body. Thus, in contrast with the conceptualization of the mind-body relationship presented by the French philosopher René Descartes in the seventeenth century , who considered mind and body to be distinct from one another and the mind as being superior to the body (Bordo, 1993), Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological position suggested that the mind and body were equivalent , intertwined, and inseparable (Csordas, 1994; Howe, 2003). Furthermore , Merleau-Ponty argued that the body should be considered not only a physical object in the world that is seen and touched by others but also a subjective site that senses and experiences the world meaningfully (Crossley , 1995). As elaborated by Crossley (1995, p. 47), “the body’s being-inthe -world is at once mediated through physical presence and perceptual meaning.” The term of embodiment therefore became a common term for referring to a state of connection between the mind and the body. For example, Young (1992, p. 90) has described embodiment as the way in which the self “is experienced in and through the body.” Morse and Mitcham (1998, p. 668) also considered embodiment to be a “summary term for all aspects of human subjectivity.” In addition to considering the body as the site of human subjectivity, and to seeing the mind and body as inseparable, Merleau-Ponty considered the body to be in a continual dialectical relationship with the social context . As Allan (2005, p. 176) elaborates, Merleau-Ponty’s view was that “the body is neither objective nor subjective because it is continually, mutually constructed through perception in each particular social and cultural context .” For example, the “body” of a girl who just immigrated to a country where she would be classified as a member of a specific visible minority, an [3.14.83.223] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 02:23...

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