Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991

19. The New York Agreements

482 chapter 19 The New York Agreements The State of Play By August 30, the South African army had left Angola. What was there to negotiate ? South Africa no longer demanded national reconciliation between the MPLA government and Savimbi, it no longer claimed that Resolution 435 should be placed on the backburner, and it agreed to end its aid to UNITA. Only one major issue remained, therefore: the timetable for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. A civil war was still raging in Angola. The withdrawal of the SADF was a heavy blow for Savimbi, but UNITA remained active through most of the country . The quadripartite negotiations ended Pretoria’s aid to Savimbi, but they would not cut off his lifeline from the United States. The Cubans had agreed that they would not fight against UNITA once the negotiations had been successfully concluded. Therefore, how significant was the length of time it took them to withdraw? Would whether they left in six months or three years affect the course of the civil war? The answer to this question depended on one’s assessment of Pretoria’s intentions. Would the South Africans honor the agreements they had signed? While it was true that an independent Namibia would create a buffer between South Africa and Angola , the SADF could still attack Angola by air or by sea, and it had an eager ally in Savimbi; furthermore, Pretoria might refuse to implement Resolution 435 and remain in Namibia. This seemed unlikely by late 1988. The apartheid regime was on the ropes, weakened by the struggle at home, increasingly threatened by economic sanctions from the international community, and humiliated by the Cubans in Angola . But could one depend on Pretoria’s sanity? Or was it, in Bertolt Brecht’s words, “The still fertile womb from which the foul beast sprang.”¹ Searching for a Timetable In Geneva, on August 2, 1988, the South Africans had demanded that all the Cubans leave Angola seven months after the beginning of the implementa- The New York Agreements 483 tion of Resolution 435. Cubans and Angolans had rejected the demand out of hand and repeated that they would not even discuss a timetable until all the South African troops were out of Angola. By the end of September, Pretoria had stretched the time frame to twenty-four months, whereas Havana and Luanda offered thirty months. The two sides differed, however, not only about the length of the withdrawal but also about the tempo: the South Africans demanded that 94 percent of the Cuban soldiers leave Angola within the first year, Cubans and Angolans offered 50 percent. (“They wanted to take out the elephant in the first year, and the tail of the elephant in the second,” Risquet observed.)² South African defense minister Malan warned that if the Cubans did not want peace—that is, if they did not accept Pretoria’s demands—“they would learn the same lesson they learnt at Cuito Cuanavale.” Not a very apt threat, considering what had happened at Cuito Cuanavale. The Namibian scoffed. “Some people just don’t know when to Quitto . . .,” read the caption above a cartoon that showed a heavily bandaged and beaten up Malan uttering his empty threat.³ When the delegations met again, in New York on October 6, Crocker suggested that the Cuban troops leave within twenty-four months, as Pretoria deIn September 1988, as the negotiations among the South Africans, Americans, Angolans, and Cubans stalled, the South African defense minister threatened that if the Cubans did not agree to his demands, “they would learn the same lesson they learnt at Cuito Cuanavale.” An odd threat, given that the Cubans had won the battle of Cuito Cuanavale. The Namibian scoffed, “Some people just don’t know when to Quitto . . .” (Copyright The Namibian) 484 The New York Agreements manded, with 73 percent of the Cubans leaving within the first year.⁴ The South Africans agreed, while Cubans and Angolans flatly rejected the proposal. Tempers flared, as the American delegation assailed the Cubans and the Angolans. In a separate session without the South Africans, Crocker’s special assistant Robert Cabelly warned that if the Cubans squandered this opportunity, “the South Africans, who had a strong army, would make their life hell.” Then, at a plenary session—the last session of the round—Crocker exploded. After listening to General Ulises Rosales reject...