In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications and Confederate Defeat

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: The Seventh Offensive, February, and March

{ 229 } ChaPTer sixTeen The Seventh Offensive, February, and March A spell of good weather inspired Grant to mount another raid against Lee’s supply line along theWeldon and Petersburg Railroad.Gregg’s cavalry division would strike out across country to Dinwiddie Court House, a stopover point for the Confederatewagon trains that hauled supplies from Stony Creek Station up Boydton Plank Road. Grant earmarked Warren’s Fifth Corps as support, planning to shove it as far south as Stony Creek Station. Humphreys received orders to guard the crossing of Hatcher’s Run at Armstrong’s Mill, the connecting link between the raiders and the Federal line at Petersburg.1 The movement began early on the morning of February 5, and it produced unintended results that caused Grant to change his plans. As Gregg and Warren set out, Humphreys took position on the north side of Hatcher’s Run at Armstrong ’s Mill. Smyth’s division established a line northward from the stream along the west side of Duncan-Harman Road for half a mile. Then the Federals continued the line eastward, across the roadbed, to Rocky Branch. Mott’s division continued the line on the east side of that brook. A small gap, caused by the stream valley, existed between Smyth and Mott.2 The Confederates sent three brigades to drive the Federals away from Armstrong ’s Mill. Cooke and McComb formed the assaulting force, with MacRae as a reserve. In a poorly conducted offensive, McComb’s brigade became disorganized , and many of its members lost their nerve to rush at the partially fortified Federals. Cooke’s North Carolina brigade was well in hand and conducted three separate attacks that never got closer than 100 yards from the Union line. Why MacRae’s fine Tar Heel brigade never went into action can only be explained by the absence of an overall commanderon the field. Most of the pressure fell on McAllister’s brigade of Mott’s division, the connecting link with Smyth, though Smyth’s men delivered some enfilade fire on the attacking Confederates.3 { 230 } The Seventh Offensive, February, and March Grant was encouraged by the Rebel willingness to dash against Humphreys. Gregg made it to Dinwiddie Court House that day, but he captured only eighteen wagons and fifty prisoners, while Warren made scant progress toward Stony Creek Station. Grant decided late on February 5 to scrap his original plan and exploit Humphreys’s success north of Hatcher’s Run. He hoped to lure more Confederates out of theirentrenchments into an open field battle and follow up their repulse by striking westward. Grant contemplated grabbing the South Side Railroad, “or a position from which it can be reached.” His order to Meade was very clear: “Change original instructions to give all advantages you can take of the enemys acts.”4 Boydton Pla n k Road Dinwiddie Court House Vaughan Road White Oak Road CS White Oak Road Line Hatcher’s Run Sutherland Station Burgess’s Mill Mill Pond Dabney’s Mill Road Dabney’s Steam Saw Mill CS Line, After Feb. Gravelly Run Warren’s Tete-Du-Pont Squirrel Level Road Vaughan Road Duncan-Harman Road R o c k y B r a n c h Ruins of Westmoreland House South Side Railroad Ft. Gregg Ft. Sampson Peebles House Ft. Cummings Ft. Wheaton Ft. Fisher Ft. Welch Claiborne Road B o y d t o n P l a n k R o a d Armstrong’s Mill Hatcher’s Run, February 5–7, 1865 The Seventh Offensive, February, and March { 231 } The BaTTle of haTCher’s rUn Meade ordered Warren to give up his march toward Stony Creek Station and assemble where Vaughan Road crossed Hatcher’s Run, about one mile downstream , or southeast, of Armstrong’s Mill.These two crossings now held prime strategic importance for the Federals. Vaughan Road offered them the shortest route from their Petersburg line westward toward Boydton Plank Road. Duncan-Harman Road ran north and south, the shortest route Confederate attackers could take to intercept the Union advancewestward. In effect, if Grant’s men could maintain their hold on both crossings, they would have secured their opportunity to head directly toward the remaining Rebel communication routes leading into Petersburg south of the Appomattox. In September, their best opportunity to do that was blunted by the construction of the Confederate Boydton Plank Road Line, but that line did not extend south...