The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi

2 Fall 1861

18 2 } Fall 1861 P reparations for war dragged on much longer than anyone on either side anticipated. Rather than a quick solution to secession, the fall of 1861 witnessed little more than the consolidation of opposing positions in Kentucky and along the Mississippi River, in addition to seemingly endless work to organize, train, and supply regiments for service in the field. Both belligerents also wrestled with the thorny problem of how to treat people within their zones of control. The Confederates were disappointed with their reception in Kentucky. Not long after occupying the southern one-­ third of the state, Albert S. Johnston complained that they joined his colors in such small numbers as to restrict his ability to push northward. “They appear to me passive, if not apathetic,” he wrote. Although there was considerable sympathy for the Southern cause among the residents, there was no “concert of action.” James L. Alcorn had to give three speeches a day to persuade even a few men to enlist at Hopkinsville. Another Rebel commander, Wirt Adams at Bowling Green, was disgusted enough to believe that Kentucky could only be secured “by the mailed hand and not by argument or interest,” because most of its residents viewed “this great struggle with stupid indifference.” Adams characterized them as “ignorant, mercenary and base.” In fact, many Kentuckians refused to accept Confederate currency when selling provisions to Johnston’s command. Secretary of War Benjamin refused to let Confederate officers use any other currency, or to discount the value of Confederate notes in order to entice Kentuckians to accept them. He preferred instead that Johnston ’s men seize supplies.1 Even so, Governor Isham Harris was delighted that Kentucky rather than Tennessee now appeared to be the future battleground of the Civil War. In early May the General Assembly of Tennessee had issued a formal invitation to the Confederate government to locate the national capital at Nashville. Such a move would have ensured adequate military resources to protect the city. Soon afterward , however, the Confederate Congress decided to move from Montgomery, Alabama, to Richmond, Virginia.2 Fall 1861 19 Harris now urged President Davis to push deeper into Kentucky, all the way to the Ohio River and even to St. Louis, to give additional security to his state’s northern border. Harris also wanted to threaten the Northwestern states, disrupting their preparations for war and disheartening their will to fight. “It is the West that sustains the Federal Government in prosecuting the war,” he wrote. “If able to take such positions as will command that section the East becomes powerless.”3 Not everyone believed that Tennessee was secure enough to allow the meager Confederate army to strike out northward on an offensive campaign. Gideon Pillow continued to worry about the state’s frontier. Only Fort Henry stood guard on the Tennessee River against the approach of a Union fleet. Tennessee had already sent several regiments to the Confederate army in Virginia and needed more guns, men, and supplies to adequately defend itself. Columbus, Kentucky, was the key, in Pillow’s view; if it fell, the entire Mississippi Valley would be lost, “with all its untold wealth.” As General John P. McCown put it, “This is a war of defense (on our part)”; there should be no talk of taking St. Louis when the homeland’s defenses were yet ill-­ formed. Madison Peoples of Carter County, Tennessee, spoke for most residents of his state when he pleaded with Judah Benjamin for more help. “If we are invaded, every Southern man will be taken a prisoner or else murdered in the night-­ time. Our very existence depends on Mr. Lincoln’s ability to invade the State.”4 At Columbus, the linchpin of all hopes for defense of the valley, Leonidas Polk wrestled with the problem of supplying his garrison. To accumulate provisions for a long siege, he temporarily stopped every shipment of food from the surrounding area by civilians. Then he sent officers out to negotiate contracts for “wheat, corn, hay, and salt” and lifted the ban when he felt he had arranged for all possible supplies.5 The Confederates may have been disappointed in the benefits they reaped from their occupation of Kentucky, but the Federals had every reason to rejoice in their share of the state. By the end of 1861, nearly twenty-­seven thousand Kentuckians had enlisted in the Union army. The Confederates were so jealous that they eagerly believed every report of discontent among those...