The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi

7 Winter Campaigns

110 7 } Winter Campaigns T he hiatus in Union offensives along the Mississippi River came to an end by the late fall of 1862 as the new regiments Lincoln had called for in July became available, swelling the size of Federal field armies. The gunboat fleet was reinforced and reorganized as well. David D. Porter replaced Charles Davis as commander of the Western Flotilla on October 15, and the gunboats were transferred to the control of the Navy Department and designated the Mississippi Squadron. Porter began to construct fifteen additional mortar boats and six more ironclad gunboats. The Eastport, Lafayette, Choctaw, Indianola, Chillicothe, and Tuscumbia added strength to the Pook Turtles. In addition, the Federals started building tinclads (light draft vessels with lighter armor) to patrol stretches of river and protect against guerrilla attacks. By the end of the war, sixty tinclads were in operation. Porter also altered the Blackhawk to make it more like a tinclad and claimed it as his flagship.1 Porter proposed the creation of an infantry, cavalry, and artillery force light enough to be transported on steamers and mobile enough to land when necessary and deal with Confederate forces along the river. On his recommendation, Alfred Ellet was appointed to organize it, and the War Department authorized the Mississippi Marine Brigade in November. Ellet’s command was an army unit but cooperated with Porter’s squadron.2 The period between Van Dorn’s defense of Vicksburg and the resumption of Union advances down the Mississippi had not dimmed Confederate views of the river’s significance. Jefferson Davis understood that the Federals could use the Mississippi as a base from which to extend east and west into Confederate territory. He pinned his strategy to defend the valley on his commanders’ ability to hold fast to Vicksburg and Port Hudson. “Nothing will so certainly conduce to peace as the conclusive exhibition of our power to hold the Mississippi river,” he informed Theophilus Holmes, his Trans-­ Mississippi commander. In a speech to the Mississippi legislature, Davis expressed the hope that continued control of “that great artery of the Confederacy” would compel the Northwestern states to David Dixon Porter. (Library of Congress, LC-­USZ62-­113173) 112 Winter Campaigns trade exclusively with the Northeastern ones, paying so much in transportation rates that they would make peace overtures to the Confederacy.3 Many citizens agreed with their president. W. P. Harris suggested giving up all points along the seacoast and in eastern Tennessee in order to garner enough troops to hold the Mississippi. Losing that great valley was “equivalent to giving up the cause,” he argued. C. G. Dahlgren noted that the Yankees could buy a bale of cotton in the occupied portions of the valley for $250 and sell it for as much as $750. He strongly suggested that Confederate authorities make a greater effort to remove or destroy all cotton within reach of the occupiers.4 Joseph E. Johnston echoed these sentiments when he took command of the western Confederate troops in the late fall. “Our great object is to hold the Mississippi,” he proclaimed, while seeking ways to increase troop strength in the region. The new Confederate commander in Mississippi, John C. Pemberton, had only 22,000 men in the northern part of the state, while Vicksburg had a garrison of 6,000 and Port Hudson was held by 5,500. According to Johnston, the Federals outnumbered Pemberton in that region , whereas the Confederates seemed to outnumber their opponent in the Trans-­ Mississippi. Everyone was loath to give up middle Tennessee and transfer Braxton Bragg’s renamed Army of Tennessee (formerly the Army of the Mississippi) to Mississippi. Moreover, even if the move were desirable, Bragg estimated it would take a month to march his 42,000 men to join Pemberton. Yet Johnston recognized that if Vicksburg fell, he would never be able to drive the Federals out again and the river would be lost forever.5 Grant’s North Mississippi Campaign Grant had every intention of moving toward Pemberton as soon as possible , for new regiments were dribbling in from the North. He had about 17,500 men at Corinth, 7,000 at Memphis, and close to 24,000 dispersed at various points in Kentucky, Tennessee, and even Illinois. All of this manpower was deployed in a defensive posture, and even then the Federals were barely able to keep open the extended rail lines that...