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CHAPTER 5 The Obligations of Citizenship Therefore, we should devote ourselves . . . to make every man understand that unless he in good faith performs his duties he is not entitled to any rights at all. —Theodore Roosevelt, speech, October 1915 O N JANUARY 20, 1944, Secretary of War Henry Stimson announced that the Selective Service had restored Nisei eligibility for the draft. Stimson declared that the draft gave Nisei the chance to restore their citizenship and to repair their public image as loyal Americans. The government had demonstrated its faith in Nisei, Stimson said, and now it was time for Nisei to demonstrate their faith in America.1 On February 22, fifty-three Nisei men were scheduled to take the train from Amache to Denver for their preinduction physicals, but five refused to go. They became the first Nisei to resist the draft, but they were not the first to protest. In Topaz and Amache, as in other camps, residents organized against the draft much as they had against the loyalty registration program the year before. Groups held meetings, filed petitions, sent letters, and tried to negotiate for a full restoration of Nisei rights before they could be drafted. Japanese Americans protested against the draft in diverse ways, including civil disobedience. Most detainees could see that the draft did little to restore Nisei rights directly when it was applied to an incarcerated population of citizens . Vague promises of a future restoration of rights did not sit well with those who knew the U.S. government had promised citizenship to Issei in exchange for military service during World War I, only to force Issei to battle for almost two decades to make the government fulfill that promise. Those who refused to comply with the draft represented the remnants of a broadbased attempt to force the government to restore citizenship rights along with responsibilities. In an attempt to squelch resistance, government officials, the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), and individual Nikkei marginalized the resisters with accusations of criminality, disloyalty, and even unmanly cowardice while promoting patriotic compliance as the only appropriate response to the draft. THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 121 THE DECISION TO REINSTATE SELECTIVE SERVICE FOR NISEI The decision to reinstate Selective Service for Nisei had been made on some levels as early as the end of 1942, but the decision was not formalized until a vote was taken on the matter at the end of 1943. The vote involved representation from G-1 (personnel), G-2 (intelligence), G-3 (operations and training ), the Provost Marshal General (PMG) and the Military Personnel Division (MPD)/Air Force (ASF). They voted unanimously to reinstate the Selective Service for Nisei; to assign inductees to the segregated 442nd Regimental Combat Team rather than distributing them generally throughout the army, to say nothing of the other branches of the military; and, for now, not to admit Issei, even on a volunteer basis. Aliens would not be allowed to volunteer until September 11, 1944.2 The decision to reinstitute the “non-voluntary induction of loyal Japanese Americans” would require a strong publicity campaign to encourage compliance and discourage resistance. Lt. Col. Harrison A. Gerhardt, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, wrote that the success of this program would “depend largely upon the hype of publicity which is given it and the method in which this publicity is handled.” The reason was the timing of this change. Recently, the 100th Battalion had suffered extensive casualties. Gerhardt warned that, combined with major unrest at Tule Lake over the issue of segregation and mistreatment of Nikkei segregated there, some might conclude “that the reinstitution of selective service was designed as an ‘exterminating measure’ for Japanese Americans.” He recommended that in light of the probable backlash against the draft, a conference should be held with representatives from the Bureau of Public Relations, G-1, G-2, the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the Selective Service, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War to design an effective information campaign that would encourage compliance with the draft and discourage dissent.3 The matter of segregation was likely to become a problem, as it had been raised immediately during the registration crisis of 1943. Nisei had asked why they were being segregated like “Negro” troops and why they were being assigned to only combat duty.4 The War Department and the WRA claimed publicly that Nisei would be segregated to highlight their achievements and to spotlight their heroism. One of the...

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