Affirmative Action and the University: A Philosophical Inquiry

25. Comments on Compromising and Affirmative Action

25 Comments on Conlpromise and Affirmative A(~tion Alan H. Goldlllan The authors of the three main essays in this volume all advocate a similar methodological approach to the issue of affirmative action at this point in the history of the debate on the policy. After so many years of philosophical and political argument, after so many interested parties have made up their minds on the issue, after so much flip-flopping by judges, members of Congress, and executive administrations, it is time, they suggest, to seek intelligent compromises that might be acceptable to all sides. Unfortunately, their well-intentioned and well-argued essays only illustrate again just how difficult compromise is to accept in this area. This will be the somewhat depressing message of my brief comments here. Lawrence Becker proposes the most detailed practical compromise. His idea is to add positions to university units in areas in which target group members are underrepresented, so that the costs of bringing such groups up to proportionate representation are not borne by members of nontargeted groups that would obtain positions in the absence of preferential policies. As I interpret his description of the proposed policy, whenever a new position opens in a unit with underrepresentation and that position is not filled by a target group member, another position is to be created that will be filled by a qualified target group member. This extra line will tllen convert to an ordinary position when the next line opens. The process will continue until proportionate representation is achieved. One minor objection to this policy is that concentrating exclusively on units with underrepresentation while ignoring those in which target groups are "overrepresented" will result in an overall greater-thanproportionate share of positions being reserved for target groups. This 296 Alan H. Goldman is minor, because I assume that adjustments can be made, because we are not close to a time in which overrepresentation is perceived as a problem by anyone, and because Becker is sensitive to real problems regarding the size of units to be measured against ratios of target group members in availability pools. The more serious question is whether under the proposed policy individuals who are not members of target groups will lose positions they would have acquired in the absence of any preference. Is it true that they will not bear the costs? Let us say that the first entry-level position that opens in a department is filled by a white male judged to be most qualified and that a woman applicant who is somewhat less qualified but still acceptable is appointed to a second, added position according to the policy's requirement. (I assume here no problem in judging qualifications in a nondiscriminatory way; more on that below.) When a second ordinary position opens several years later, it is considered filled by her (her extraordinary position is converted as the policy requires to keep costs manageable). Suppose also that were the new position to be advertised, it would be filled by a new graduate most qualified for it. Then that new graduate will not be acquiring a position she or he would have acquired in the absence of preference (in fact, the strongest kind of set-aside preference). If the policy is widespread, then that new potential applicant will have sharply reduced opportunities. It should make no difference to opponents of preference whether the later graduate is male or female. They see it as unfair that those who have worked to achieve the highest qualifications for positions do not obtain those positions to which they would have been appointed under nondiscriminatory and nonpreferential criteria. Given the economic realities of the past twenty years and the very limited resources available to university administrations, Becker's proposal to convert added positions to ordinary ones seems far more feasible than simply adding however many positions are required to achieve proportionate representation quickly. But without such permanent additions, the costs of achieving such representation faster than the market would will still be borne in the form of reduced opportunities for individuals, some men and some women, who had no part in earlier discrimination. This will not be acceptable as a compromise by present opponents of preference who understand the effects of the policy. We still need to wrestle with the question of whether proportionate representation of different groups is a legitimate goal in itself Comments on Compromise and Affirmative Action 297...