Hegel on Religion and Politics

6 The Active Fanaticism of Political and Religious Life

6 The Active Fanaticism of Political and Religious Life Hegel on Terror and Islam Will Dudley Hegel says so much, about so many things, that his rare silences are conspicuous and significant. Among the topics about which he remains largely silent, Islam stands out as one of the most surprising. Indisputably a world-historical phenomenon for well over a millennium before Hegel’s birth, Islam would seem to deserve a prominent place in his extensive account of determinate religion. And yet it receives no proper discussion: whereas Hegel accords systematic significance to Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, and to the religions of the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans—he mentions Islam only in passing, first in the course of his treatment of Judaism, and then again in his account of Christianity, where he links it once more to the Jewish religion, but also, intriguingly, to the French Revolution. Hegel describes Islam and the French Revolution as two manifestations of abstract formalism, and goes on to assert, without qualification: “the religion of Islam is essentially fanatical.”1 The Lectures on the Philosophy of History also associates the ancient religion 119 120 Will Dudley of Mohammed with the political upheaval in modern France, declaring: “‘Religion and terror’ was the principle [of Islam], [just] as ‘Liberty and terror’ was [the principle of] Robespierre.”2 This chapter addresses three related questions: First, why does Islam play such a limited role in Hegel’s system? Second, on what basis does Hegel justify his claim that Islam is essentially fanatical and terrorizing? Third, what insights does Hegel offer regarding the overcoming of religious fanaticism? Attempting to answer these questions will lead us to examine the structural analogy Hegel identifies between Islam and the French Revolution. 1. The Absence of Islam from Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion Hegel’s systematic account of religion begins with a specification of the concept of religion itself. Religion, in Hegel’s view, is like art and philosophy in that it is a means by which human beings come to know the truth. But whereas art allows us to see or hear the truth, and philosophy gives us the truth in conceptual form, religion enables us to feel the truth. Feeling, as Hegel defines it, is the subjective connection to a content, and it is this subjective connection to the truth that the doctrines and practices of religion seek to establish. If religion is to give us a felt connection to the truth, rather than to something else, it must present the truth in a way that is not only emotionally powerful but also determinate. Religions do so by developing symbolic myths and ritual practices that attempt to represent the truth in ways capable of evoking a felt response. Hegel judges each religion according to the ability of its doctrine and practices to arouse feeling for the truth. Because all religious doctrines and practices are capable of arousing powerful feelings, the sole criterion for such judgment is the extent to which the truth is in fact adequately represented by the myths and rituals that comprise each particular religion.3 At the center of each religion is its portrayal of God, which Hegel calls “a representation of the philosophical idea that we make for ourselves .”4 Each historical religion has, in Hegel’s view, furnished its God with the qualities that best represent its understanding of the truth. It is well known that Hegel thinks that Christianity represents the truth most successfully, and for this reason he refers to it as “the consummate religion.” Hegel regards other religions as imagining God in ways that represent the truth only partially. 121 The Active Fanaticism of Political and Religious Life Although there is no limit to the number of particular religions that may develop in the course of human history, Hegel believes there are only a finite number of ways in which God may be conceived, and thus only a finite number of conceptually distinct religions. His account of determinate religion claims to provide an exhaustive survey of these religious possibilities, while also identifying the historical religion that best realizes each of them. For example: Buddhism is the religion of being-within-self; Zoroastrianism is the religion of light; and the Greeks developed the religion of beauty. But Islam has no place in this story, because Hegel does not regard Islam as the primary instantiation of any of the basic forms of religion. Consequently, as we...