The Other Plato: The Tübingen Interpretation of Plato's Inner-Academic Teachings

TWO Epekeina tes ousias

TWO EpEkEina TĒs Ousias On Plato, Republic 509B Hans Joachim Krämer 1. It is well known that the allegory of the sun in Plato’s Republic includes the difficult proposition: just as the sun is the cause (αἰτία) of becoming, without itself being becoming (οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα), so the good is the cause of being, without itself being a being, i.e., is superior to being in its dignity and power: “the good gives being [εἶναι] and substance [οὐσία] to what is known, while the good itself is no substance [οὐσία], but is rather beyond being [οὐσία], exceeding it in rank and power.”1 This mysterious “throwing beyond” or “beyondness” (ὑπερβολή [509C2]; μειζόνως τιμητέον [509A4]; ὑπὲρ ταῦτα [509A7]) has been of repeated concern to modern interpreters,2 and a convincing explanation has not been reached. The solutions that have been proposed so far can be summarized in four groups: (1) the good relates as an αἰτία to being, just as a principle relates to that of which it is the principle [Prinzipiierten]. Thus, the good cannot itself be a being.3 (2) According to its essence, the good entails the end, highest perfection, or normative direction for everything that exists, and thus should necessarily be located beyond being.4 (3) “Beyondness” marks the firstness, singularity, indivisibility, or absoluteness of the good, in contrast to every particular and dependent being.5 (4) The good is the “transcendental”—and, even 39 40 THE OTHER PLATO for Plato, concealed—condition of the possibility of being, knowledge, and truth, insofar as it is pre- or beyond being.6 Of these positions, the fourth is a transcendentally modernized variation of the first, which dismisses from the outset an adequate historical understanding of Plato’s statement. But the third position also emphasizes only certain characteristics of the concept of a principle, and is thus subordinate to the first solution. The two remaining positions differ in that one—to put it in Aristotelian terms—presupposes the concept of a causa efficiens (and probably formalis as well), while the other is committed to a causa finalis. However, it is doubtful whether or not these are sufficient, and to what extent, if any, they can be proven. The relationship between a principle and that which is grounded by the principle also holds, mutatis mutandis, for the Presocratic question of ἀρχή as well. With respect to the Presocratics, however, it is not possible to find evidence of a differentiation that is similar to the Platonic one. The philosophical reason for Plato’s having introduced this differentiation still remains unknown. The justification through a final principle, however, which immediately starts with the good, does not fully do justice to the more comprehensive function of the good as the principle of knowledge that is contained in the allegory of the sun.7 In the case of the relationship between the good and οὐσία, it is highly questionable as to whether or not we are primarily dealing with a relationship of being [Seinsverhältnis]. This suspicion is supported by the fact that in book VI of the Republic Plato explicitly refrains from uncovering the real essence of the good (509D–E; cf. 509C).8 In light of this situation, it is not surprising that recent philosophical commentators on the Republic resign and dismiss any form of further “speculation.”9 Indeed, all attempts at explanation that have been proposed so far are stipulated conjectures, which often isolated the passage 509B from its historical background and often projected later philosophical positions onto it. In particular, it has not been sufficiently recognized that Plato’s philosophical predecessors and contemporaries provide important clues for a historically grounded interpretation of the passage. Furthermore, the fact that Plato refrains from providing the essence of the good (τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθόν) (509D8f.) in the Republic has been ignored, which necessarily takes the statements concerning the allegory of the sun out of context, because the functions of the good discussed there, must emerge from its concealed essence, and can thus only be adequately known based on the knowledge of this essence. 2. To begin with, the surrounding Platonic Academy allows us to narrow down the meaning and importance [Bedeutung] of the beyondness of being [Seinsüberwurf] in Plato. Three different testimonies provide proof of the 41 EPEKEINA TĒS OUSIAS same conviction on the part of Plato’s nephew and successor Speusippus concerning the original principle [Urprinzip] of the one (ἕν). The one of Speusippus, according to Aristotle, is “not even a being (ὥστε μηδὲ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ ἓν αὐτό)” (Met. N.5, 1092a14f.), while...