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Translator’s Notes Translator’s Introduction 1. SW 7: 311–44; GA I.10, 143–70. 2. SW 3: 498; GA I.7: 130. 3. Kompetenzzentrums für elektronische Erschließungs- und Publikations­ verfahren in den Geisteswissenschaften an der Universität Trier, Das Deutsche Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm auf CD‑ROM und im Internet, 5: 3921–23. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. SW 3: 447; GA I.7: 90. 7. SW 3: 436; GA I.7: 81. 8. SW 3: 391–92; GA I.7: 43. Interpretive Essay 1.  For a particularly illuminating schema of division, cf. Julius Drechsler, Fichtes Lehre vom Bild (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1955); Christian Maria Stadler, Freiheit in Gemeinschaft (Cuxhaven: Traude Junghans Verlag, 2000), 28–31. 2. Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997), 28: 50. 3. SW 7, 311–44; GA I.10, 143–70. 4. For a penetrating analysis of the incompleteness of Fichte’s system, cf. Sven Jürgensen, “Die Wissenschaftslehre als System der unvollendeten Vollendung,” Fichte‑Studien 16 (1999): 19–38. 5. For a concise account of the relation of Fichte to Kant, cf. Frederick Neuhouser, Fichte’s Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 11–31. 6. In Peter L. Oesterreich’s words: “The dominant picture of the pure transcendental philosopher has, in the last decades, put Fichte the philosophical rhetorician, cultural critic, and political teacher far in the shadows. That Fichte belongs to the few philosophers who were able, with their public lectures, talks, and speeches, to intervene in historical life and collaborate in the spiritual revival of their time seems today hardly worthy of attention. By thematizing applied philosophy, we therefore 203 204 The Closed Commercial State enter into a region of the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte that remains little known and little investigated” (“Die Bedeutung von Fichtes Angewandter Philosophie für die Praktische Philosophie der Gegenwart,” Fichte-Studien 13 [1997]: 223). This translation, and all translations from the German, are my own. 7. SW 3, 387; GA I.7, 37. 8. The scholarly understanding of German idealism has traditionally often presented a rather simplistic picture of a development leading from Kant through to Fichte, Schelling, and finally Hegel, who represents the culmination of the idealist project. Fortunately, in the last decades, this picture, which is derived in part from Hegel’s own self‑assessment, has been challenged, and a much more nuanced understanding of German idealism has emerged, stressing not only the importance of early readers of Kant such as Salomon Maimon and Karl Leonhard Reinhold, but also the diversity of the different philosophical perspectives that would develop within, and in conversation with, the idealist tradition. Of particular significance, in this regard, is the work of Dieter Henrich, a number of whose writings are now available in English. 9. SW 3, xxxviii; cf. GA I.7, 4. 10. FIG 3, 147. 11. GA 1.7, 17–18. 12. Ibid., 21. 13. GA II.1, 104. 14. Ibid., 103. 15. Ibid. 16. SW 6, 80; GA I.1, 235. 17. SW 6, 108; GA I.1, 258. 18. SW 6, 109; GA I.1, 259. 19. SW 6, 109–10; GA I.1, 259–60. 20. SW 6, 115–16; GA I.1, 264–65. 21. SW 6, 117; GA I.1, 266. 22. SW 6, 117–18; GA I.1, 266. 23. Cf. Jay Lampert, “Locke, Fichte, and Hegel on the Right to Property,” in Hegel and the Tradition: Essays in Honour of H.S. Harris, ed. Michael Baur and John Russon, 40–73 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). 24. SW 6, 119; GA I.1, 267–68. 25. Cf. Zwi Batscha, Gesellschaft und Staat in der politischen Philosophie Fichtes (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1970), 36; Manfred Buhr, “Die Philosophie Johann Gottlieb Fichtes und die Französische Revolution,” in Fichte— die Französische Revolution und das Ideal vom Ewigen Frieden, ed. Manfred Buhr and Domenico Losurdo, 26 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1991). 26. SW 6, 178–89; GA I.1, 315–24. 27. We need not suppose, however, that this apparently statist turn in Fichte’s thought implies a rejection of the possibility of justified revolution. Rather, it marks a shift toward a different concept of the revolutionary class, and a more radical grounding of revolution. In the Closed Commercial State the right to revolution no longer belongs principally to those whose rights and property have been violated, but rather to those who have been excluded or expelled from the sphere of...

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