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7_________________ Countdown to Statehood In December 1947, the British government first announced its intention to withdraw all its troops from Palestine and terminate the Mandate on May IS, 1948 (later changed to May 14).1 The leaders of the Jewish Yishuv knew they had five months to create effective state institutions that would fill the vacuum the British left behind. The countdown to Israeli statehood had begun. On September 13, 1993, when Arafat and Rabin exchanged an historic handshake on the White House lawn confirming the declaration of principles (DOP) between Israel and the PLO, the Palestinians were placed in a similar position. According to the agreement that was to come into effect on October 13, Israel would begin to withdraw its troops within two months from Gaza and the city of Jericho and complete its withdrawal three months later. Thus, Palestinians also had five months to prepare for self-rule, the details of which were to be ironed out by an interim agreement. In actual fact, the Palestinians had much longer. The Cairo Agreement, which translated the DOP into reality by creating the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza and Jericho, was only signed on May 4, 1994, and the elections, originally scheduled for early 1994, took place two years later. But these delays could not have been known when the countdown to Palestinian self-rule began. The following chapter analyzes the behavior of the PLO in the critical months before the creation of the PA, its impact on the PA's subsequent consolidation under Yasser Arafat when the outside finally territorialized under international agreement, and the likely impact of the elections of the future Palestinian state in relation to the themes developed throughout this book. FROM DOP TO THE CAIRO AGREEMENT: DEINSTITUTIONALlZATION INSTEAD OF STATE BUILDING For the political analyst, the Zionist state building that took place immediately before Israel's declaration of independence provides a unique comparison with which to examine Palestinian state-building efforts between the signing of the DOP and the emergence of the Palestinian Authority in May 1994. Often the transition from national liberation movement to state, described in Arabic rhyme as the problem of transforming "al-thawra," the 125 126 COUNTDOWN TO STATEHOOD revolution, into "al-dawla," the state, calls for the depoliticization of society by the state elite. Former revolutionary organs and activists are absorbed into the state bureaucracy and security services.2 This is what occurred in both the Zionist and Palestinian experiences. The difference, however, is the extent to which the pre-independence political organs and elites of each were absorbed into the new political center. In the Zionist experience, the new institutions both retained many former structures and absorbed their elites; old political parties and leaders continued to share in the decision-making process with David Ben-Gurion. In the Palestinian movement, by contrast, depoliticization hollowed out political structures both within the PLO and in the occupied territories, thus creating a political vacuum that facilitated autocratic patrimonial rule.1 The weakening of the PLO was probably more dramatic and eventful than the patterns of deinstitutionalization in the West Bank and Gaza. The PLO rarely followed clearly defined procedures for decision making, and it was hardly likely to alter its course in the face of massive elite opposition to the DOP. This elite included formerly close allies of Arafat's such as Faruq Qaddumi, Muhammad Darwish, and Khalid al-Hasan.4 According to Bayan aI-Hut, a noted historian of the Palestinian movement, Article 7 of the 1964 Fundamental Law (AI-Nizam al-Asasi) gave the PNC sole authorization to ratify international agreements.' Furthermore, since the agreement in her opinion contradicted the national covenant, to ratify it, it would be necessary to revise the covenant as a whole, a procedure requiring a two-thirds majority of the PNC. Arafat could hardly muster such support. Instead, he decided that the Central Committee, established at the 7th PNC in Cairo (June 1970) as an intermediary body between the 15-member Executive Committee and the 450-member PNC, would be authorized to accept or reject the agreement.6 Yet even then, the ratification process was clouded in ambiguity. To begin with, none of the sources agreed upon either the number or composition of the committee (one source speaks of 1007 members, another 107H). Many more attended than voted. Ghassan Khatib, a leading member of the PPP who supported the agreement, sharply criticized the selection process, claiming that al\ those chosen to attend belonged to...

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