Bureaucratic Ambition: Careers, Motives, and the Innovative Administrator

4. The Market for Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs: Career Path and Professional Innovation

chapter four The Market for Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs Career Path and Professional Innovation When I became chief my top priority was CALEA accreditation. . . . We open ourselves up for inspection from an independent body, which comes and looks at everything we do, from the logos on our police cars to how we handle evidence and complaints. In our city it’s a very diverse community. We’ve had strained relationships with the minority community. I thought that this would be one way of sending a signal that we are open, transparent, and that we conform to national and international standards for community policing. chief of a large city police department planning to look for another job within five years I don’t really have any specific proposals planned for the council this year. I guess my goal for the next twelve months is to get by and make the best of it. chief of another large city police department planning to retire within five years Policy entrepreneurship occurs when an individual introduces a policy innovation that satisfies some public demand. Like their commercial counterparts , policy entrepreneurs must assume some costs or takes some risk in pursuit of innovation with the expectation of some future payo√. For business entrepreneurs, the payo√ is clear: commercial innovators emerge in a market to capture profits. Entrepreneurial elected o≈cials who champion policy innovations may seek reelection or election to higher o≈ce. The ‘‘profits’’ available to an entrepreneurial public administrator are less clear. Indeed, the very idea of ‘‘bureaucratic ambition’’ seems almost oxymoronic in light of the common depiction of bureaucrats as impersonal, myopic, rule-bound satisficers. Classic Weberian bureaucratic organization is in fact supposed to ensure compliance with rules, roles, hierarchical accountability, and stan- The Market for Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs 87 dard operating procedures (Weber 1978). Bureaucratic policy entrepreneurs risk sanction, including possible removal, if they deviate from organizational norms or pursue policies disfavored by their elected superiors. With their livelihoods on the line and families relying on them, bureaucrats have ample disincentives to initiate innovations without prompting from their elected masters. It is hardly surprising that the stereotypical bureaucrat is conservative and risk-averse, for public administrators seem unlikely candidates to emerge as policy entrepreneurs. Yet many do. Despite the costs and risks, professional public administrators are among those whom scholars of the policy process identify as policy entrepreneurs most frequently. For better or for worse, working with or around or against their elected o≈cials, many bureaucratic policy entrepreneurs are successful innovators. Others are sanctioned or fired for their e√orts, as the cases in chapter 2 illustrate. Why do some administrators take such risks in the name of innovation, sometimes even in the face of explicit opposition by interest groups and elected o≈cials? Why do others proceed more cautiously and forego opportunities for innovation? This chapter explains how government hiring and promotional practices encourage or inhibit bureaucratic policy entrepreneurship and professional innovation. Analysis of American police chiefs and water utility managers shows that administrators’ career paths predict their introductions of professional innovations to their agencies. I also examine a familiar alternative hypothesis along the way: that bureaucrats’ professional socialization, not career path, explains the adoption of professional innovations. The picture that emerges is mobile bureaucrats as something like professional policy pollinators, bringing innovations from profession to governments as they move from one to another. Bureaucratic Mobility and the Market for Innovation Bureaucratic jobs form when a government employer o√ers to pay an individual for her services and that individual accepts the job. The set of all governments and all individuals o√ering services form a market for professional bureaucratic labor. For the individuals seeking employment, the marketplace o√ers varying salaries, perquisites, and prestige. For governments looking to hire bureaucrats, the marketplace o√ers varying degrees of professional expertise and innovation. I argued in the last chapter that governments’ 88 Bureaucratic Ambition hiring and promotional practices create opportunity structures in which bureaucrats may advance. Opportunities that involve moving from one government to another tend to reward individuals with favorable professional reputations . Professional reputations are not so important where advancement opportunities are predominantly within an agency. Ambitious administrators adapt to these conditions by pursuing (or not pursuing) professionally fashionable innovations. In this way, bureaucratic labor markets are markets for professional innovation. Bureaucratic policy entrepreneurs are most likely to emerge where government demand for innovation meets...