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6 Extending the Argument: Implications of Secure Contracting among Constitutional Democracies NOW THAT WE have examined the contracting advantages of democracies, we want to see if the theory does more than explain the democratic peace. A robust theory should offer insights into a range of related phenomena. Looking beyond the questions of war and militarized conflict, we want to see what else our contracting theory predicts and then check these predictions against established research findings. If the predictions hold up, we have additional grounds for thinking democracies are at peace because they are reliable partners. If secure contracting really does explain the democratic peace, then we should also expect the implications presented in table 6.1. These inferences cover a broad range of international relationships and, if borne out, they strengthen our confidence in the contracting explanation.1 They also meet two crucial tests proposed by Imre Lakatos and Mancur Olson. Lakatos says a theory is retrograde if it simply “predicts” previously known facts, facts that the theory itself was designed to cover.2 To be progressive, a theory must predict new data and uncover unexpected relationships. Olson adds that theories are stronger and more persuasive if they explain a diverse array of facts.3 Both tests are worth taking. The goal, however, is not simply to pile up more findings, however wideranging . The real goal is to cumulate these findings as part of a larger, integrated whole—one that gives us a better understanding of war and peace. Dina Zinnes calls this integrative cumulation, which she distinguishes from the mere addition of findings.4 We cannot achieve such integration by pure induction, piecing together results by trial and error, like a jigsaw puzzle. Rather, we must begin with a theoretical explanation and see if its predictions are supported by a wide range of empirical work. The theory itself then serves to integrate the findings, making them part of a coherent picture rather than disjointed pieces. Our contracting theory is just such a proposed explanation for the democratic peace, with larger implications for international politics. The hard questions are whether it predicts a diverse array of facts, highlights unexpected relationships, and serves to integrate them within a coherent and powerful explanation. C HA PT ER 6 140 TABLE 6.1 Table of Conjectures: Implications of Reliable Contracting between Democracies Self-protective Self-protective mechanisms are stronger and more extensive when agreements mechanisms involve non-democracies Alliance duration Alliances are more durable when only democracies are members Learning effects Because of learning effects, longer periods of joint democracy should produce more stable peace Conflicts early in Corollary on learning effects: More serious, militarized conflicts between relationship democracies should occur early in their relationship and diminish over time New democracies New, weak, or marginal democracies should not be part of the democratic peace because such states cannot eliminate commitment problems Enduring rivalry Long-term rivalry among democracies should be very rare Better at every level Democracies should have some militarized disputes, but there should be fewer of dispute at every level along the escalation ladder Near-misses “Close calls” between democracies should involve fundamental, existential issues since less important matters can be resolved through agreement Clear-sighted Democracies should assess each other’s capabilities and intentions more accurately than nondemocracies do Shocks When democratic regimes are threatened by external shocks and instability, the democratic peace should be weaker Leadership change Changes of leadership pose greater concerns when bargains involve nondemocracies Bilateralism When issues are bilateral and within the control of two democracies, their bargains will be stronger and more reliable than if third parties are involved or the external environment poses a major risk Are the Additional Predictions Right? Self-Protective Mechanisms Self-protective mechanisms are stronger and more extensive when agreements involve nondemocracies. When agreements carry high risks of nonfulfillment, the parties have three basic options. They can decline to make an agreement altogether; they can make an agreement but refuse to rely on it; or they can buttress the agreement with mechanisms designed to increase the likelihood of performance or lessen the impact of nonperformance. States use all three options to cope with risk, threats, and uncertainty. Our focus here is on the mechanisms used to buttress agreements, the topic of our conjecture. States employ a wide range of techniques to protect themselves when dealing with risky partners, where the dangers of breach are high. In addition, they monitor performance more intensively and lessen their reli- [3.21.233.41...

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