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The Soviet Role in the Creation of Israel Reconsidered
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Rude & Barbarous Kingdom Revisited: Essays in Russian History and Culture in Honor of Robert O. Crummey. Chester S. L. Dunning, Russell E. Martin, and Daniel Rowland, eds. Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2008, 367–87. The Soviet Role in the Creation of Israel Reconsidered Richard Hellie The “living spirit” of the Eastern support to Israel was Stalin himself.1 It is doubtful whether Israel would have come into being had it not been for Soviet support.2 Certainly one of the most enigmatic events of the 20th century was the role of the Soviet Union in the creation of the state of Israel. It made little sense in 1947, and with six decades of hindsight, it seems to have been an even less wise move on the part of the USSR. No one doubts that Soviet support was absolutely vital for the creation of Israel out of the League of Nations mandate of Palestine. But there seems to be absolutely no concensus on why the Soviet leaders, Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich, Molotov, Vyshinskii, Khru-‐‑ shchev et al., all thoughtful and intelligent (if somewhat mentally disturbed) individuals, did what they did or why they thought it was either in their im-‐‑ mediate or long-‐‑term best interest. One can only wonder why that group of intelligent men could not (or did not) foresee at least some of the negative consequences the creation of Israel would have for the Soviet Union/Russia. I have been hoping that some high-‐‑level discussions/communications/memoirs on the issue would come to light, but to date I am aware of nothing. The pur-‐‑ pose of this essay is to examine these issues given the currently available data and see whether some sense can be made of them. There are many hypotheses on why the Soviets pressed for the creation of Israel—the alleged motives of Stalin & Co.: 1. For decades one position was that the Soviets did it to annoy Britain (“to pull the British lion’s tail”), to which Palestine had been mandated by the League of Nations after World War I and 1 Voroshilov to Mikunis at Dmitrov’s funeral, Sofia, July 1949, cited in Arnold Kram-‐‑ mer, The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947–53 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 81. 2 Yaacov Ro’i, Journal of Israeli History 22: 1 (Spring 2003): 21. 368 RICHARD HELLIE the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.3 The problem with this thesis is that Britain was scheduled to pull out of Palestine even before Israel was created, as discussed below.4 2. The “logic” of the first point is aided by the fact that the British consistently hindered Jewish migration to Palestine, and the Sovi-‐‑ ets reasoned that the Zionists had no more love for the British than they did. The Soviets calculated that with a mutual adversary, friendship with Israel might be possible. The Soviet expectation was that Israel would be an anti-‐‑colonial and anti-‐‑West-‐‑European power.5 History certainly did not work out this way, at least not for very long. 3. At least modestly convincing is the proposition that Stalin already in 1928 proposed exploiting contradictions between capitalist states. After 1945 he saw his chance. Relations between the United Kingdom and the United States became quite strained over the problem of Palestine.6 Britain, in charge of the Palestine Mandate, 3 Heller traditionally notes that Soviet aid stemmed from the wish to undermine Brit-‐‑ ish imperialism. Joseph Heller, The Birth of Israel (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 62. See also Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 222; Paul Johnson, A History of the Jews (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 527. Johnson has recently stated that in the years 1944–48, “Soviet policy was more pro-‐‑ Israel than America’s” (The New York Times, 3 August 2006). A variation on this was that Britain converted Lebanon into its “springboard to reach Russia’s border,” and the Soviets hoped to be able “to render it useless by intervening in the Palestine issue.” Documents on Israeli-‐‑Soviet Relations 1941–1953, ed. Yaacov Ro’i (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 135. Before Gromyko’s speech in 1947, getting the British out of the Middle East was a primary Soviet objective (Documents on Israeli-‐‑Soviet Relations, 174). 4 Britain decided to pull out of Palestine in January–February of 1947 and turn it over...