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300 Animal Welfare and Human Values 'prejudice' what is now customarily meant. He was referring to the habits of mind which are "the wisdom of ages" and preferable to the brilliant abstractions of philosophers. For Aristotle and Burke how we do feel is a prima facie indication of how we ought to feel which stands unless countered by further evidence and reason. How we do feel is prima facie evidence of the content of our moral collective unconscious minds. Humankind's attitudes to the animal kingdom are thus the starting point of understanding our obligations. There is substantial evidence that highly communal and pre-literate societies have a greater sense of identity with the animal realm than have more individualistic societies. Generally, though, the animals that are respected the most, that are treated with awe, are those which possess the 'most admirable' characteristics, e.g., those that are courageous, care most for their own family members, displaythe greatest amount of cunning, etc. Those that are admired and respected the most possess characteristics worthy of imitation. They also respect those they fear. Today, beyond our concern for domestic animals, we appear to give the greatest consideration to those threatened with extinction or extirpation from a particular habitat. This is a part of our recognition of nature's diversity and interrelatedness and our awareness of the ecological dangers we are facing, although it should be noted that even among vertebrates we show distinctly more concern for the plight of, say, the humpback whale (which is only threatened) over the salish sucker (which is endangered). Of course, consideration for the interests of threatened or endangered species usually requires the preference of their interests over those of other species. If we are to apply our conception of individual human rights to animals then, of course, we would be prevented from considering overall ecological interests at all. We must conclude either that the ecological considerations are inappropriate or that animal rights differ in some manner from human rights. Ecological considerations have in fact led us in two different directions simultaneously. On the one hand, as we have come to recognize the problems the planet faces, we have come to find it necessary to protect some species by harming others, to kill some animals of a species in order to assist the healthier ones, and the like—to apply collectivist criteria, criteria by which the interests of the whole differ from that of the sum of the individuals.On the other hand, as we have come to recognize ourselves as an integral part of the animal world, sharing a common threat to our well-being, some come to have a genuinely shared relationship with animals, or at least some relationship where little or none existed before. Just as in wartime we feel a greater common bond as a consequence of a common purpose so, too, under a threat to our common environment we feel a common belonging, The Philosophy of Animal Protection 301 albeit in a weaker way. As we come to share a relationship with annuals, as we come to feel a sense of common belonging, so it becomes increasingly difficult to ignore criteria of individual justice. This is especially so when we have a personal and durable relationship with the annuals concerned. But if we wish to protect the environment we cannot afford to comply with the sentiments of justice we feel. We are truly, once more, on the horns of a dilemma. The closest traditional relationship of human to animal has been that with the working animal, and the degree of respect awarded—and in a subsidiary sense earned—has related to the animal's capacity to perform its tasks. Relatively recently, the dog has been introduced to new tasks: the seeing-eye dog and hearing-ear dog, for example. It has become their nature to perform the tasks allotted to them. And what we admire in the working dogs' capacity is something we perhaps mistakenly regard as intelligence, for scientific data based on brain to body size suggest the dog to be less 'intelligent' than the camel and the walrus. The difference, we suppose, is that the camel is less willing to do our bidding and the walrus scarcely at all. Canine compliance may have a lot to do with our respect. Certainly, in a working relationship the essentially shared features of community can be felt in like manner and to the same degree as in a companion relationship. In fact working...

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