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Chapter X The Battle for Control, 1933 John L. Lewis is credited with immediately realizing labor's potential under Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act and with carrying out the organizing campaign that dramatically reversed the downhill course American labor had followed since 1919.1 In assessing the significance of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Lewis declared, "From the standpoint of human welfare and economic freedom, we are convinced that there has been no legal instrument comparable with it since President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation."2 At a later point in his address to the delegates of the 1934 UMWA International Convention, Lewis outlined the vigorous nationwide organizing campaign that had been intiated under his direction. Coincident with the signing of the act by the President, the United Mine Workers of America conducted a vigorous organizing campaign in all the mining Districts of the United States. Systematic plans were laid out, meetings were addressed by able Field Representatives, and the enrollment of new members took place upon an unprecedented scale. It was easily demonstrated that the mine workers employed in the non-Union areas of the mining industry would enthusiastically join the UMWA if they were privileged to do so. Local Unions were established, local Officers selected and installed, supplies furnished the Local Unions, and in less than 30 days from the signing of the act by the President, the complete organization of the bituminous industry was effectuated.3 Although Lewis deserves recognition for his leadership of the nationwide organization campaign, it is apparent that the UMWA organizational drive in Utah was as much in response to local opportunities and threats as it was part of any systematic nationwide plan. The opportunity 165 The Next Time We Strike for the UMWA came in May 1933 when miners at Standardville struck over a reduction in wages; the threat to the UMWA came from the rival National Miners Union (NMU), which entered the Utah coal fields several weeks before the proposed NIRA was sent to Congress.4 In early May, the Standard Coal Company cut wages of men working in its Standardville mine in Spring Canyon. The miners maintained that the reductions violated company promises to the Roosevelt administration and went out on strike.5 John L. Lewis was immediately apprised of the Standardville situation by a telegram from George Cole, president of District 22.6 Cole saw the strike as an excellent opportunity to organize the Utah coal fields and sought support from Lewis to send a sufficient number of organizers to accomplish the task. The reply from Lewis was noncommittal. "It is practicable to take advantage of any situation in Utah which may lead to organization but suggest it is unwise to assume any financial liability under present circumstances."7 In his next correspondence to President Lewis, George Cole, reflecting the influence of the lukewarm response, explained that his intention was to send Tony Radalj to Utah to determine the cause of the strike and the feelings of the Utah miners about unionization. Cole concluded: "If the report is favorable then we will go down there and do the best we can; I realize that we will have to be careful down there because we don't have any money to get us out of trouble if we should get into any. It's hell to be poor John."s Lewis concurred with the plan to send Radalj to Utah and again cautioned against incurring the large financial obligations of "strike benefits , legal expenses and other things which usually come from a strike in a non-union section." Looking beyond the immediate situation at Standardville , Lewis saw the organization of Utah more likely after the passage of national labor legislation that would give "to labor the right to organize and to collectivelybargain through representatives of their own choosing."9 In less than two weeks, John L. Lewis changed his mind about an organizational campaign in Utah. On May 27, 1933, three weeks before the NIRA was signed by President Franklin Roosevelt, International Representative Nicholas Fontecchio was charged with organizing the Utah coal miners. Fontecchio was supposed to cooperate with the District 22 officers, but Lewis made it clear that Tony Radalj, also an international board member, who had been responsible for Utah during much of the 1920s, was to work under the direction of Fontecchio.10 Frank Bonacci was rehired as an organizer, and Utah quickly became a major objective 166 The Battle for Control, 1933 in the...

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