American Conservatism: Thinking It, Teaching It

Postscript: As We Approach the Future

173 Postscript As We Approach the Future I write in the immediate aftermath of the election of Barack Obama as president of the United States. The 2008 election reinforces my sense that there is a rising tide against American conservatism or, more accurately, against the Bush administration and its policies and performance. As such, it remains essential to keep in mind both the distinction between the conservative movement and the Republican Party and the differences among the various and often confusing claims on conservatism. It remains clear, however, that what we are experiencing seems more a crisis in conservatism than a resurgence of liberalism, more a collapse of the Republican Party than an embrace of the Democrats, despite some survey and electoral data suggesting a possible sea change, especially among young voters. The shelves are packed with books by disillusioned conservatives who feel betrayed by the Bush administration and by liberals hopeful of resurrecting the intellectual, moral, and political power of their own faith.1 For one, most conservatives, including the religious right, the paleo- or isolationist wing, and the neocons, have been trying desperately to separate themselves from George W. Bush. One hears, often, the lament that Bush betrayed conservatives, that he never really was a conservative , that he was a tax-and-spend big-government chief executive, that he lined up with the country club Republicans on the immigration issue, that he was seduced by nefarious neocons to violate traditional conservative principles in seeking war in Iraq, that he embraced liberal solutions in education and health care that were budget busters. All that seems left to praise are his court appointments, which are indeed quite a legacy from the point of view of right-wingers. What one hears outside of conservative circles is that this has been 174 American Conservatism: Thinking It, Teaching It the worst president, the worst administration in American history or, at least, in the twentieth century, that it has done more damage to the national interest—Iraq, the “war on terror,” environmental neglect and abuse, corruption, cronyism, erosions of fundamental liberties, abuses of power, deepening gaps between the rich and everyone else. All of the above will be debated for decades. What it will suggest about American conservatism will be determined more by what follows from the two terms of the Bush administration, not only in the narrow political sense, but perhaps more significantly in the sense of our national discourse. To return to the lament of Lionel Trilling, voiced more than a half century ago, does our political culture need a conservative voice, a conservative tradition? Are we diminished by the absence of ballast, a sobering perspective to temper our historical tendencies toward an ahistorical utopianism, an intolerant moralism, and a can-do spirit whose sunniness obscures an abiding immaturity? One way to approach this issue is to ask what is rarely asked, either during the 2008 campaign or elsewhere: What does it mean to call proposals for huge tax cuts for the most privileged “conservative”? Why do we accept calls for the most draconian responses to undocumented immigrants “conservative”? Does it make sense to assume that opposition to stem cell research or abortion or affirmative action or gun control or environmental protection in terms of global warming is “conservative ”? Why define Protestant fundamentalism as “conservative”? Yes, self-described conservatives take such positions, but in what ways are these stances consistent with conservative tradition and values? In the presidential campaign it has been striking to me that the discussions of whether John McCain is conservative rarely get past the level of assertion and denial. It is apparent that his nomination and candidacy for the presidency have exacerbated the fissures between the conservative movement and the Republican Party. Perhaps, if we are so fortunate, the nation will come out of this extraordinary campaign prepared for a conversation about what we mean by American conservatism. Much within this volume suggests that we still suffer from the absence of a traditionalist, Burkean conservatism, that what operates in its name—libertarianism, big-business selfishness, politicized fundamentalism , neoconservatism—does not speak to, indeed, characteristically contradicts and subverts, conservative values. I have argued that whatever has emerged to articulate conservatism has come in liberal guise, a kind of conservative liberalism or liberal conservatism. Louis Hartz was certainly right to suggest that we have only a liberal tradition, but he did As We Approach the Future 175 not...