Smoke in Their Eyes: Lessons in Movement Leadership from the Tobacco Wars

Conclusion: With a Little Bit of Luck

293 Conclusion With a Little Bit of Luck In the last chapters, I have argued that the collective leadership of the tobacco control movement, heroes all, nonetheless blew the opportunity of a lifetime. Of course, Big Tobacco’s lobbying and propaganda machine, and its indentured politicians, undermined the McCain bill. But it was tobacco control’s own leadership that helped deliver the killing blows. Yet fairness mandates the acknowledgment that this same leadership came close, very close, to extracting from Congress the strongest bill possible—that this book might, instead, have celebrated the brilliant citizen lobbying campaign that led to the development of the McCain bill and its successful enactment into law. Such a campaign need have differed very little from what actually took place—at least in its public manifestations. Let us go back in our imaginations to that November 1996 strategy session in which Matt Myers and Dick Daynard convened a cross-section of tobacco control leaders to contemplate the possibility of a proffer of compromise from the tobacco industry. Recall that Matt asked the group, “What set of public health provisions, if any, would we demand as the price for giving the industry relief from the threat of bankruptcy posed by litigation?” Let us now imagine that instead of chilling the very discussion of compromise, the assembled group deliberated long and hard, explored mutual goals and concerns, recessed, and agreed to go home and consult quietly with their colleagues and come together again early the next year. Then imagine that they did just that and forged a consensus that comprehensive public health policies like those in the McCain bill, but nothing less, would indeed be worth conceding to the tobacco compa- 294 Smoke in Their Eyes nies predictability in their lawsuit payments—caps on their annual liability payments—but otherwise preserving all existing avenues of litigation against them. Now imagine that the assembled group, having come to that consensus , then turns to “movement maneuver,” the ways to achieve such an ambitious objective. As they assess the political environment, they painstakingly develop a delicate outside-inside strategy. The establishment leaders and groups—the Center, ACS, AHA, AMA—will play the insider role, agreeing to negotiate and extracting as much as possible in public health concessions from any negotiations that might take place. Secretly, all the players would continue to meet to coordinate strategy . Publicly, however, those leaders and groups more attuned to aggressive modes of outside advocacy would soon distance themselves from the negotiations, demanding far more than could be achieved in any negotiated settlement. They would set up a din, constantly threatening to pursue litigation to the death of the industry and to challenge in the upcoming elections any member of Congress willing to accept less than all of their public health provisions. To make this outside-inside strategy credible, the leaders agree that they must publicly splinter, to create the public perception that the antisettlement forces are all truly furious with the settlement negotiators . And not wink until Clinton signs a good law. Now imagine nothing other than what actually ensued: First, Matt Myers negotiates and is able to tell the tobacco industry negotiators that he comes to the table with the knowledge and support of major public health leaders—and the tacit assumption that their organizations will support a settlement if it meets most of Matt’s demands on their behalf. Now imagine that the leak to the Wall Street Journal is not a shock to Julia Carol or other key grassroots leaders in the tobacco control movement, because Matt has kept them informed and they, in turn, have abided by the conditions of confidentiality. Matt reports to a secret meeting of the November 1996 group augmented by Drs. Koop and Kessler, and by Congressman Henry Waxman and Minnesota attorney general Skip Humphrey. Matt has made progress, but there remain unresolved issues both on the public health provisions and on the extent of liability protections that the industry insists upon. They all agree that they now need publicly to distance themselves from the negotiations—and from Matt—so that they can Conclusion 295 make effective demands that the settlement be strengthened. They also agree that it is critical during this volatile period that they hammer away at the perfidy of the industry, lest the public and Congress drop their guard against the inevitable industry chicanery. Once again, the leaders and groups do exactly...