Smoke in Their Eyes: Lessons in Movement Leadership from the Tobacco Wars

8. A Suspect Consensus

59 8 A Suspect Consensus In a series of conference calls in December 1996 and January 1997, supplemented by one-on-one conversations, Matt Myers and Bill Novelli raised a series of hypothetical questions with the leaders of health voluntary organizations, essentially the same hypothetical questions Matt had raised in New York. Would they accept, even support, a compromise that to some extent freed the tobacco industry from civil liability for all its past lies and deceits, in exchange for a broad affirmative mandate from Congress that also granted FDA powers, a stiff penalty sufficient to force prices up significantly, other long-sought public health mandates, and some mechanism for holding the industry accountable for its past acts? These conversations were intense. As Matt recalls: “In some respects I have a great deal more sympathy for how people reacted later, because it required time and energy to figure out what we really cared about, what we really thought was feasible, what our own view was of what we could accomplish, what the right tools were.” The responses that emerged would have infuriated Glantz and Carol—if they had been privy to them. Matt remembers: It was clear from those discussions that at least the CEOs of those major organizations came at this from an entirely different approach than the sentiment that had dominated in that November meeting [in New York]. John Seffrin wasn’t alone or out of the mainstream at all in advancing the notion that if there really was an opportunity to bring about major change in these core areas, that had to be seriously explored. The responses that we were getting were extraordinarily favorable. Yet what we were talking about was significantly less than what would later be on the table. To a person, the reaction at the time was euphoric on their part. And the liability issue wasn’t a lightning rod at all. 60 Smoke in Their Eyes To a person, that is, except for John Garrison, head of the American Lung Association, who was not so much opposed as distracted. In contrast to Seffrin of the Cancer Society or Hafner of the Heart Association , who were personally committed and deeply knowledgeable on tobacco control issues, Garrison up to that time had largely delegated responsibility for tobacco issues and followed the lead of his Washington office staff. As Matt remembers: “Garrison was fundamentally uninterested. It wasn’t like he sat on the phone and later raised objections . He was just fundamentally uninterested.” By early February 1997 Matt was able to craft for the CEO group a draft titled “Statement of Core Principles for the Consideration of the Resolution of Current Outstanding Tobacco Issues.” To the unpracticed eye, these principles appear identical to the principles asserted in Matt’s memo memorializing the consensus at the November meeting. That is, they unequivocally warn Congress “not to cut short the opportunity for real progress by compromises that promise much, but accomplish little,” as in the past. They run through the usual litany of advocates’ demands, from broad FDA regulatory powers to full public disclosure of internal industry documents. And they affirm: “The rights of victims of the tobacco industry to be justly compensated for the injuries they have suffered should not be abridged and the tobacco industry should not be immunized from accountability for its own wrongdoing .” But to the wary eye, the precise wording of these principles opened a crack in the wall holding back congressional mischief in three ways: 1. The principles left room for legislation restricting civil actions against the companies—restrictions that some advocates would view as a form of “immunity” for the companies—while providing compensation for smokers and their families afflicted with smoking-caused disease, perhaps through a plan such as workers ’ compensation, that could be seen to “justly” compensate the victims of the tobacco industry. 2. In the text supporting the principles, the statement excoriates efforts by the industry to escape “immunity from future wrongdoing ,” leaving unsaid whether a penalty and compensation scheme might also grant the industry immunity from its past wrongdoing . 3. The statement contemplated the possibility that Congress might act. It did so by indirection, that is, by enjoining Congress not to Leading toward Settlement 61 act unless a consensus could be reached that addresses all key public health goals without infringing on the rights of tobacco’s victims. As is the way of this world...