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160 7 Designation,Characterization,andTheory inDewey’sLogic Douglas Browning John Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) provides an elaboration of the theoretical outcome of a rather exhaustive inquiry into inquiry. More specifically, it provides a general theory of inquiry that is proposed as clarifying and justifying three hypotheses regarding logical form.1 Given this aim of providing an exposition and defense of such a theory, it is hardly surprising that Dewey does not see it as essential to his task to take the reader through the course of the inquiry into inquiry which culminated in that theory or to set out its distinctive phases of the designation and characterization of the subject-matter.2 He does not do this, but he does provide significant clues regarding the general pattern that such an inquiry into inquiry will follow, if carried through with proper care. Relying on such clues, I will attempt to distinguish the major phases of that pattern. I will then argue that confusion among these phases is logically disastrous. The Phases of Inquiry into Inquiry [I]nquiry occupies an intermediate and mediating place in the development of an experience. If this be granted, it follows at once that a philosophical discussion of the distinctions and relations which figure most largely in logical theories depends upon a proper placing of them in their temporal context ; and that in default of such placing we are prone to transfer the traits of the subject-matter of one phase to that of another—with a confusing outcome . (Dewey 1916, MW10:320) I begin by distinguishing (A) Dewey’s developed theory of inquiry from (B) the inquiry into inquiry which culminated in that theory. A. On Dewey’s developed theory, any inquiry must follow the general pattern of inquiry. The pattern of inquiry is therefore exhibited by both first- Designation, Characterization, and Theory 161 order inquiries (or primary inquiries, as Dewey calls them), which are not inquiries into inquiries, and second-order inquiries, which are.3 This applies as well to an inquiry into inquiry-into-inquiry. The pattern of inquiry that Dewey proposes begins with a problematic situation that is evoked by an indeterminate situation. It moves through initial observational orientation within that situation to the institution and hypothetical formulation of the problem, follows through the phases of the observational and conceptual sort, enters into reasoning in the narrow sense, experimentally tests hypotheses, and culminates in a final judgment that marks the final transformation of the stream of problematic situations into a situation which is determinate relative to the indeterminacy that has been taken as problematic. It is important to emphasize that, on this theory, every inquiry is initiated by and within a specific situation with a unique and pervasive quality of indetermination. The specificity of this situation and of the problem taken to be appropriate to it, then, limits the scope of the resulting inquiry and the solution at which it aims. Thus there will be as many different inquiries into inquiry as there are distinctive problematic situations that initiate them and problems to be addressed by them. On the other hand, the consummation of a successful inquiry into inquiry will be limited to a “terminal sentence” that serves both as (a) the “asserting” of the hypothesis which has received final affirmation and (b) the final judgment instituting the determinate situation.4 The hypothesis “asserted” by the terminal sentence in an inquiry into inquiry will be an account of that subject-matter, namely, the specific range of inquiries inquired into, in regard to just that limited and specific problem to which it provides a response . Now, any such limited account may be said to be a logical account, at least if Dewey is correct in saying that inquiry into inquiry yields logical theory,5 but it is not necessarily the same as a general theory of logic of the sort which Dewey proposes in the Logic. It would be the same only if the inquiry into inquiry were initiated by a problematic situation which was itself such as to yield a problem of such broad scope that only a general logical theory could answer to it. In fact, Dewey sets up the problem addressed in the Logic in just that way. It is identified as the main or focal concern of the logician, namely, that of determining the ground of logical forms, in other words, the forms involved as norms for arriving at conclusions . This means that the concern of...

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