The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations

Chapter 4 Establishing The Political Hotline

First-round negotiations: Foreign Minister Aichi visits America Talks between the Japanese and American governments began at the end of April 1969 with preliminary negotiations in Washington attended by Tògò Fumihiko, bureau director of the Foreign Office’s North American Affairs Bureau. Tògò described the event as follows in his memoirs: In essence, I explained in these talks that the Japanese government accepted the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese jurisdiction as set forth in the aforementioned framework. None of the discussions at the State Department, the White House, and the Pentagon gave rise to any great debate, although I felt the Americans’ stance on both the nuclear issue and the use of bases in conflict situations seemed particularly rigid. However , the Americans were clearly prepared to begin specific discussions concerning the reversion issue, and it was my impression that they intended to address the matter of nuclear weapons once a satisfactory understanding on the wartime use of the bases had been reached.1 Tògò’s “aforementioned framework” refers to the basic position of senior Foreign Ministry officials. He describes it in his memoirs as follows: Chapter 4 Establishing The Political Hotline Nothing had happened in the talks with the United States since the departure of Ambassador Johnson in the middle of January, but from the beginning of February Prime Minister Satò let it be known that he wished to see Okinawa reversion be governed by the same conditions as those affecting the Japanese homeland (including the provisions for prior consultation) and that he intended to make an important decision if problems persisted over these issues. As the situation became progressively clearer, ministry officials, in order to advance the talks with the Americans, had obtained Prime Minister Satò’s approval on a number of matters—namely, encouraging a detailed examination by both governments of prior consultation over the nuclear issue and the use of military bases in the event of war—all with a view to coordinating both sides’ political and military needs in a framework guaranteeing Japan’s local defense, maintaining the 1960 Security Treaty, and ensuring Okinawa’s reversion in 1972.2 Among senior Foreign Ministry officials, Tògò had a reputation for being particularly reliable and discreet. Consequently, his unusually forthright press statement on May 2 (after he had returned from the United States and reported to Prime Minister Satò), in which he indicated that he felt that the White House and State Department examination of the Okinawa issue had progressed further than he had anticipated , attracted considerable attention. Press reports the day following Tògò’s announcement noted as follows: It seems that Mr. Tògò has sought through the negotiations to establish a foundation for demanding from America a “nuclear-free homeland-level [reversion]” in the [forthcoming] June talks between Foreign Minister Aichi and U.S. Secretary of State Rogers3 and that the U.S. response was, not surprisingly, lukewarm. According to Mr. Tògò, the U.S. response has been, first, to appreciate Japan’s various concerns but to indicate that given the mood in Congress regarding the Okinawan bases, any successful proposal would require congressional backing; second, the U.S. side pointed out that following the reversion of Okinawa, it would be hard to explain to the American people why the United States would still be required to guarantee Japan’s and the Far East’s security; and third, in terms of maintaining security, it would be necessary to consider the likely impact on neighboring nations if the U.S. base presence on Okinawa were sharply reduced. From this, Mr. Tògò has apparently concluded that the U.S. government is certain to maintain a tough position on the question of removing the nuclear bases and implementing the Security Treaty–defined prior consultation system. At the same time, Mr. Tògò indicated that while he recognized that Korea and other countries had an interest in the outcome of the Okinawa reverEstablishing the Political Hotline 87 sion issue, he had secured U.S. agreement that the matter would be treated as one primarily affecting Japan and the United States. Mr. Tògò also made clear that the Americans seemed eager to make headway in the negotiations between Foreign Minister Aichi and Secretary of State Rogers in June and that a national security meeting on the Okinawan issue would probably be held before Mr. Aichi left for the United States. Whatever...