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79 chapter 4 Plato’s Doctrine of Forms In Chapter 2 I investigated historical connections between Plato and the pre-Socratics through the study of the Parmenides. Parmenides’ ontological tradition of Being, answered the question of the one and the many with the theory of Forms and exposed before the Eleatic school one of the key problems of the theory, namely, the separation of Forms from sensibles . But the investigation also indicated that Plato’s Forms had radically changed the one and many debate from a cosmogonical schema, in which universals were understood as primordial stuff out of which the world was made, to an ontological schema, in which universals were viewed as eternal ideas that exist permanently within the Parmenidean realm of Being and independent of Becoming. Behind this paradigm change, there is a complex system of Forms that categorizes reality in a linear hierarchy and defines ontology in degrees, which subsequently becomes one of the most influential categorizations in Western metaphysics. This chapter asks to what extent this system has reshaped the landscape of the OM debate and whether we can compare the two ontological systems of Ge Hong and Plato, which increasingly diverge in content. The main passages for the discussion of Plato’s ontology come from the Republic: the Divided Line, the Simile of the Sun, and the Simile of the Cave. The Timaeus provides the background of Plato’s cosmology and gives breadth to his Forms. Forms: Immanent or Transcendent? The doctrine of Forms is not a consistent thought throughout Plato’s dialogues . In the Symposium (211a–b), the Republic, and the Timaeus (51e–52d), which are grouped in the middle and the later dialogues respectively,1 the Forms are clearly transcendent above and ontologically independent from sensible objects. The Forms in the Meno and Phaedo (102b) are comparatively immanent within sensible objects. These two types of Forms create the disjunction within the doctrine of Forms. Which type of Forms represents Plato’s thought on the relationship between Forms and physical objects? Traditionally it has been accepted that Plato postulates transcen- 80 textual studies dental Forms and keeps perfect Forms and imperfect physical objects ontologically apart.2 Recent scholarship tends to read the disjunction to be not as great as typically thought and attempts to reconcile the inconsistency .3 Among the emerging new views, Gail Fine’s arguments appear to be the most provocative. In two essays “Separation”4 and “Immanence,”5 the central argument not only has turned against the traditional interpretation , but has gone to the other extreme to argue immanence as the central feature of Forms. However, the Fine view also meets serious criticisms. Vlastos states that the same claim on separation may be expressed by either (P) or (Q): (P) The forms exist “themselves by themselves.” (Q) The forms exist “separately.” Vlastos argues that Plato holds both expressions to be true. He then explains, “So there is a good reason to accept the equivalence of (P) and (Q) as authentic Platonic doctrine.”6 Daniel Devereux also defines the traditional view as an accurate account of Plato’s doctrine of Forms: “I believe that Plato’s views on immanence and separation are consistent and clear-cut: from the Phaedo on, he denies that Forms are immanent in their participants, and he is committed throughout to the claim that all Forms are ontologically independent of sensible particulars.”7 Having noted the dispute, let us consider a Daoist view. If the texts demonstrate that inconsistency does exist within the centerpiece of Plato’s thought, then why shouldn’t we simply accept the ambiguity? Apart from the logical contrary of transcendence and immanence, is there anything more to the ambiguity? To affirm Forms as both transcendent and immanent may not be a logical contradiction to be rejected but could well represent an intellectual challenge to discover connections between transcendence of truths and their immanence within physical realities. By asking how one can participate in many without ceasing to be one, the topic of transcendence and immanence or essence and existence will lead us into the study of Plato’s theory of the one and the many. But first we should come to terms with Plato’s ontological degrees. Ontological Degrees: A Hierarchy of “One over Many” Plato’s ontology classifies what is (or ontos) by defining reality in degrees. It categorizes reality by quantifying rationality on a scale consisting of the Form of Good, Forms, sensibles, and images each possess. For Plato the scaling of...

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