Aspects of Alterity: Levinas, Marcel, and the Contemporary Debate

4. Transcendental Philosophy

4 Transcendental Philosophy I want to utter you. I want to portray you / not with lapis or gold, but with colors made of apple / bark. / There is no image I could invent / That your presence would not eclipse. Rilke, Book of Hours Close! Stand close to me . . . let me look into a human eye; it is better than to gaze into sea or sky; better than to gaze upon God . . . Herman Melville, Moby Dick The preceding chapters should illustrate both that Marcel and Levinas philosophize in an exceedingly similar, though by no means identical , manner and that there are several significant details on which they are in diametric opposition. Building on these propaedeutic chapters, we must address these points of convergence and divergence , and the underlying assumptions made by each thinker that lead to such radical differences in otherwise similar philosophies. Bringing Levinas and Marcel into dialogue must take place in two spheres: the transcendental and the concrete. This method makes sense, indeed it is suggested, if we consider the critical voice of each of these thinkers. Levinas’s critique of the tradition is indeed ethical, but it is formed in transcendental terms—he says as much in Totality and Infinity.1 He claims that philosophy cannot account for the other and that, without the other, philosophy cannot account for fundamental conditions grounding subjectivity, freedom, truth, language, 92 etc. In contrast, Marcel’s criticisms are generally ‘‘concrete’’ in nature , in the sense laid out in the previous chapter. That is, he attacks philosophies that cannot account for the fullness of our experience— philosophies that, giving in to the spirit of abstraction, address parts of persons as if the parts were the whole person.2 Neither this chapter nor the next should be taken as an exhaustive exploration of either the criticisms or rebuttals associated with these philosophies. Rather, both the present chapter and the next are meant to pose questions specific to the philosophy of intersubjectivity as described by both these thinkers; to find, where possible, grounds for agreement or reconciliation and, where reconciliation is not possible, to sharpen and define what is at stake in the difference. First, then, we will take up the question of otherness on a transcendental level, bracketing concrete questions until the next chapter . As I noted briefly, the transcendental character of Levinas’s thought is a hotly debated topic.3 Therefore, ‘‘transcendental’’ should be taken here in a general sense, indicating the analysis or description of the conditions for the possibility of . . . (experience, truth, subjectivity, world, etc.) and the general project of ‘‘working back’’ toward and focusing on these conditions. Levinas’s transcendental critique argues (1) that sociality is prior to ontology, and (2) that sociality requires a distinct and separate other who is absolutely other prior to an encounter with the self. In the wake of Levinas’s transcendental critique of the tradition, we are unable to ignore the necessity of being able to account for, or encounter, the other on the most fundamental level. Only after determining how these thinkers fare in this transcendental analysis can we move on to consider each in terms of the concrete manifestations of his thought. In reflecting on the transcendental aspects of Levinas’s and Marcel’s philosophies, I will tend toward a critical consideration of Marcel because: (1) Levinas’s philosophy is more or less explicitly transcendental while Marcel’s is not, and (2) Marcel is one of several philosophers who is a specific target of Levinas’s transcendental critique. This task will be complicated by the fact that, while there are numerous places in which Levinas discusses Marcel, Marcel is essentially silent regarding Levinas. He neither treats Levinas directly nor responds to the criticisms Levinas levels against him. Therefore, the approach of this chapter will be a critical assessment of Marcel’s work through the eyes of Levinas—with the dual goals of attempting to answer some of Levinas’s criticisms and, simultaneously , bringing into sharper relief those issues on which sigTranscendental Philosophy 93 nificant disagreement remains. However, we should not lose sight of the larger goal of questioning otherness per se. In comparing and contrasting the two philosophies, we ought to keep in mind that, in addition to the unique relevance of these thinkers and the way in which their philosophies are mutually illuminating, we are discussing Levinas and Marcel as archetypes or...