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RUNNING HEAD VERSO 4 The War the KBG Lost ■ The Moscow trade network was already a political force in the Brezhnev era, having acquired considerable influence during the 1960s due to its increasing autonomy in the allocation of resources in the capital. Its political successes were most apparent in the food sector. The leaders of the Moscow trade organization used their influence to promote their interests and were quick to defend the interests of their organizations whenever they were threatened.1 This was particularly true in the 1980s, when the KGB launched its anticorruption campaign against the Moscow trade network. The campaign ran from 1982 to 1987, although, after 1985, at a lesser level. It comprised distinct phases, the first, in late 1982 and in 1983, being the toughest for the Moscow trade staff, whose resistance was then at its weakest. The KGB had a free hand after the appointment of Andropov as leader of the Communist Party, and the population, including the nomenklatura, was afraid of the security forces and did not dare to show any opposition. In addition, the KGB benefited from prevailing attitudes in Russian society at this time for different reasons. Initially, the anticorruption operations in the capital represented a change, and people may have believed that cracking down on corruption was the best way to eliminate the problem. The KGB had built up a stock of sympathy during the 1970s and enjoyed the trust of the population. In contrast, the trade organizations , especially the food sector, were not well thought of by the public, and their staffs were suspected of being deeply involved in irregularities. The embezzlement of socialist property by trade employees was seen as the main cause of shortages in the grocery stores. Mindful that popular dissatisfaction was high, 0  the KGB had been closely watching the grocery stores since the beginning of the 1970s. Thus, in 1982, the KGB had at least two reasons to attack corruption in the food sector in particular. First, it already knew a lot about the situation there and possessed evidence on trade leaders, and, second, because of the popular frustration with respect to this sector, it hoped to generate wide political support for Andropov. The KGB, in the first year of its war against corruption, arrested several trade employees and gathered evidence incriminating them, but it was not empowered to prosecute and try people, a rather complex task that was under the jurisdiction of the Prosecutor General’s Office. Furthermore, in 1983, the KGB filed charges against middle- and high-ranking trade executives, who were easier targets than their higher-level counterparts—the senior Party and government officials. Many executives arrested in 1983 arrived at the conclusion that their only option was to capitulate to the KGB’s requests to corroborate all the accusations against them. Hoping that their sentences would be substantially decreased if they collaborated, executives were ready to submit to the KGB’s prosecutors and divulge evidence that compromised their superiors. The executives inclined to cooperate with the KGB were those who knew the most about the wrongdoings of high-ranking executives or officials. It happened, however, that arrested employees willing to serve the KGB were sometimes misled: their apologies and the acknowledgment of their guilt did not necessarily improve their situation. In fact, employees often received severe sentences whether they cooperated with security forces or not. Ambartsumyan, for example, was executed even after having provided more testimony than any of his colleagues. Petrikov’s testimony led to the disgrace and eventual arrest of Tregubov, but he was still sentenced to ten years in a labor camp (table 4.1). Distrustful and experienced organizations like the KGB were aware that suspects might testify in detail and denounce many officials to save their own lives rather than do so for the good of the society. Thus, the slanderous information on high-ranking officials obtained in this context could not only compromise the friends and protectors of the accused but also worsen the arrested person’s situation. For example, after having refused to divulge the identity of his bribe-takers, Sokolov changed his mind and decided to cooperate with the KGB when they promised to reduce his sentence. The result was of no benefit to Sokolov, who was soon executed anyway. The Moscow Trade Leaders Counterattack Not surprisingly, the trade executives were the most vehement defenders of their accused colleagues; their own fears of being imprisoned spurred them to help those who had been arrested...

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