In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

100     ChaPTER 4     Political institutions, enGaGement, anD ParticiPation Listening to people talk about their experiences with new economic policies implemented during the 1990s gives us insight into how institutional changes linked to neoliberal reforms influenced their ability and desire to participate in politics. New policies and different state-society relationships suppressed the political activity of the poor by decreasing their capacity to participate, by eliminating incentives for targeting the state and national governments with political action, and by reducing their preference for political activity. Although interviews provide compelling evidence of the mechanisms linking institutional changes to changes in political activism, it is of course possible that there is something unique about Oaxaca or about the experiences of those interviewed. Is this institutional explanation of political participation valid outside of the admittedly small number of cases used to generate it? Does it hold true even after controlling for other possible explanations of political participation, such as income, education, and organizational involvement? A series of rigorous statistical tests examines the various arguments. Does political participation have its roots in political institutions, or is it best explained by individual socioeconomic resources and political attitudes? Do holzner text-3.indd 100 8/6/10 10:52 AM Political Institutions, Engagement, and Participation  101 political institutions affect the political activity of the rich and poor differently ? This is an important step for at least three reasons: (1) it will help determine whether the experiences of the poor in Oaxaca are unique or typical of people experiencing neoliberal reforms elsewhere in Mexico; (2) by including a variety of institutional factors into statistical models we will be able see which ones matter most for political participation, helping us refine our institutional theory of political participation; and (3) most importantly multivariate regression is a powerful means of testing the importance of institutional factors against other plausible explanations common in the literature , thus helping to rule out competing explanations of the decline in the political participation of the poor—namely that the poor participate less precisely because they are poor. Key Hypotheses Several key hypotheses are used to test the relationship between neoliberal reforms, socioeconomic status, and political activity. Together, they summarize many of the primary theoretical expectations that emerged from the institutional framework developed in chapter 2. These hypotheses serve as preliminary tests of that framework. Income and education. Income, education, and other personal resources should still matter for political action. The key question is whether and how much they matter after controlling for the effect of institutional factors. If it is the case that institutional factors create obstacles for the poor to participate in politics, then ▪ Hypothesis 1: We should expect that the effect of income on participation will diminish after controlling for institutional factors. Organizations. The literature predicts that organizations, especially labor unions and political organizations, will have a powerful impact on political activity. Nonpolitical organizations can also have a powerful mobilizing effect , particularly in new democracies as a more plural civil society creates opportunities for activism. However, neoliberal reforms weakened the mobilizing potential of many organizations in Mexico by reducing access to government officials, eliminating resources, fragmenting civil society, and encouraging many to focus on self-help activities rather than political action. ▪ Hypothesis 2a: Labor unions will have relatively small, if any, effects on political participation. To the extent that they do encourage political activism, their effect will be greatest among middle- and upper-income Mexicans who are more likely to be members. holzner text-3.indd 101 8/6/10 10:52 AM [18.117.148.105] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 15:53 GMT) 102  Political Institutions, Engagement, and Participation ▪ Hypothesis 2b: The effect of nonpolitical organizations on political participation will also be modest, especially among the poor. ▪ Hypothesis 2c: Clientelist political mobilization will remain important among the poor, so that people who are asked to participate in politics are offered gifts by political campaigns or who receive visits in their home by political organizers will be more likely to be active in politics. Public policies, antipoverty programs, and access to government officials. Institutional factors that increase the benefits, decrease the costs, or increase the likelihood that activism will be successful should stimulate political activity. ▪ Hypothesis 3a: Government spending programs should have a strong effect on the political behavior of recipients who develop a stake in mobilizing to maintain access and increase the benefits. It may also make them feel “closer” to the government than people who receive no assistance . The effect should...

Share