Philosophical Inquiries: An Introduction to Problems of Philosophy

On the Improvability of the World

189 the Improvability thesis Since Voltaire, most people have thought it absurd of Leibniz to deem this vale of tears to be the best of possible worlds. And what principally gives people pause here is that they see this world as imperfect on grounds of potential remediation. Laplace, for one, maintained that, given the chance, he could readily improve on the natural world’s arrangements. And other bold spirits often think the same. It is perfectly clear, so they say, that this, that, or the other modification would make this a better world. And from there it is only one short and easy step to the conclusion that a benevolent creator does not exist.1 All the same, this idea that the world is improvable by tinkering is deeply problematic. The task of the discussion is to show how this is so. non-Improvability vs. theory and optimalism The idea that the actual world as we have it is the best possible goes back to Plato’s Timaeus: 14 on the Improvability of the World rescher phil inq text.indd 189 3/1/10 3:15 PM 190 on the IMProVaBIlItY of the WorlD The divine being (theos) wished that everything should be good and nothing imperfect as Far as POssibLe (kata dunamin) . . . since he judged that order (taxis) was better than disorder. For him who is the supremely good, it neither was nor is permissible to do anything other than what is the best [among the possibilities].2 What Plato envisions is a world that, imperfections notwithstanding, will nevertheless be optimal—that is, “for the best”—in being just as perfect as the realities of the situation permit. From Leibniz onward, the optimalist has faced the charge of being a Dr. Pangloss who will acknowledge no evil in the world—much like that familiar trio of wise monkeys who “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil.” So what is it that could possibly favorably incline someone to Leibniz’s contention that this is the best of possible worlds? Well, there is, to begin with, the consideration, to which none of us can be wholly indifferent, that this is the world in which we ourselves exist. One can hardly avoid seeing this circumstance in a favorable light. Dr. Seuss captures the point admirably: [W]orse than all that . . . Why, you might be a WASN’T! A Wasn’t has no fun at all. No it doesn’t. A Wasn’t just isn’t. He just isn’t present. But you . . . You ARE YOU! And now isn’t that pleasant!3 Then, there is also the more impersonal consideration that this is a world whose developmental processes have brought intelligent beings into existence. This too one cannot but see as a good thing. To be sure, such considerations merely argue for good and not yet for best. This is something that has to be based on more complex considerations. What most fundamentally stands in the way of conjectural improvability is the pervasive interconnectedness of things. This means there is no real prospect of local tinkering with the world without wider ramifications. In this world—and indeed in any possible world—states of affairs are so interconnected that local changes always have pervasive consequences. rescher phil inq text.indd 190 3/1/10 3:15 PM on the IMProVaBIlItY of the WorlD 191 The domain of fact has a systemic integrity that one disturbs at one’s own peril: a change at any point has reverberations everywhere. Once you embark on a reality-modifying assumption, then as far as pure logic is concerned all bets are off. Any local “fix” always has involvements throughout, and consequently, no tweaking or tinkering may be able to effect an improvement. For the introduction of belief-contravening hypotheses puts everything at risk. In their wake, nothing is safe anymore. To maintain consistency, you must revamp the entire fabric of fact, which is to say that you confront a task of Sisyphean proportions. (This is something that those who make glib use of the idea of other possible worlds all too easily forget .) Reality is something too complex to be remade anymore than fragmentally by our thought, which can effectively come to terms only with piecemeal changes in reality but not with comprehensive changes of reality. Reality’s reach has a grip that it will never entirely relax: it is a tightly woven...