Electing Chavez: The Business of Anti-neoliberal Politics in Venezuela

6 POLITICALLY PROMINENT BANKERS AND THE HISTORICALLY ROOTED CALCULUS TO ASSIST CH

6 ◆ P O L I T I C A L L Y P R O M I N E N T B A N K E R S A N D T H E H I S T O R I C A L L Y R O O T E D C A L C U L U S T O A S S I S T C H Á V E Z T ’ response to Venezuela’s  bank crisis shaped the political calculus of a core group of the elite outliers who reportedly assisted Chávez in . As described earlier, the bank crisis was the font of numerous corruption allegations against both high-ranking government officials and bankers. It was the political prominence of business in the midst of this scandal-driven crisis, however, that fueled divisions among bankers in , divisions that shaped the political calculus of bankers in . We can discern this historically rooted political calculus of the elite outliers only by looking beyond the immediate interests of businesspeople and considering how these interests are framed by perceptions of state-business relations in the near past. To see how the political calculus of the business elite is historically rooted, we must first understand how the political prominence of business during the   bank crisis fueled divisions among bankers. The Caldera administration (–) appeared to break with the tradition in Venezuela of swiftly rescuing banks at risk of insolvency and not punishing their former executives. That administration’s response to troubled banks, which some viewed as slow, harsh, and uneven, divided bankers. Some bankers, mostly those at troubled banks,suspected that the Caldera government had treated them unfairly.Others, mostly those not at risk of insolvency, believed that the government had done what was necessary to get the country out of financial crisis. We must then consider how the two ways that bankers were politically prominent at the time fueled suspicions that the government’s response to the  bank crisis had been unfair. Some bankers had gained political prominence because they became identified as the likely patrons of political leaders during the Carlos Andrés Pérez administration (–). In fact, the banks the Caldera administration was accused of treating unfairly had been represented within the disgraced administration of President Pérez,President Caldera’s longtime political rival, through a number of high-profile political appointments. Some bankers associated with troubled banks had also become identified politically as the patrons of Caldera’s contenders in the  presidential election. The political identification of certain bankers with Caldera’s political rivals led many to speculate that Caldera’s slow, harsh, and uneven response to the troubled banks had been unfair. They suspected his actions had targeted the banks of politically identified bankers for political reprisals.Regardless of their veracity, the speculations reveal how becoming politically identified inVenezuela aroused fears among business actors that the rivals of their political clients, when in power, might target them for reprisals. Other bankers had gained political prominence within the Caldera administration . The proliferation of businocrats among the financial sector regulators (those who orchestrated the Caldera government’s response to the  crisis) fueled speculation that the government had treated the failing banks unfairly. In fact, those responsible for the government’s response to the crisis tended to have ties to banks that emerged largely unscathed from the crisis.This circumstance led many to speculate that the Caldera administration responded to the crisis more in accordance with the interests of the banks represented inside the government than with those of the wider banking community or the public more generally. Again, regardless of their veracity, these speculations reveal how the presence of businesspeople within government aroused fears Part III. Business Assistance for Chávez  among businesses that the government was acting on behalf of their businocrat competitors. That a visible presence of business within the political arena might divide business and arouse suspicions of the government runs counter to leading theories and affirms an underappreciated insight of Venezuelanist Javier Corrales. Leading theories of economic development posit that the ideal developmental state—one that is best able to foster economic development—is both autonomous enough (independent of any particular business interest) to act on behalf of the public’s general well-being and embedded enough within the business community to inspire business cooperation (Evans ). But Corrales revealed that the economic reformers who...