The Politics of Sexuality in Latin America: A Reader on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights

The Rationale of Collective Action within Sexual-Rights Movements: An Abstract Analysis of Very Concrete Experiences

The Rationale of Collective Action within Sexual-Rights Movements An Abstract Analysis ofVery Concrete Experiences Mario Pecheny Translated by Mariana Alcañiz I  the ways in which actors intervene in the field of sexual citizenship , two perspectives of political analysis, which at first appear inadequate for this object, turn out to be quite revealing: game theory and communicative action theory. In previous studies, I have approached the topic of political claims for sexual rights and / prevention and treatment within the context of claims for equal citizenship [. . .] (Pecheny ). The ways in which the identity and sociability of nonheterosexual persons are structured [. . .] have implications on the political strategies of sexual minority movements. These modes of sociability—some exclusive of nonheterosexuals, others common to our contemporary market-driven world—install logics of political construction, actions and debates, often invisible, which boycott the collective objectives. Because of these rationales, individuals and groups who pursue an interest or a collective or individual good in a seemingly rational way (according to the terms of game theory) are made to arrive at results which are not the best, and may even be the worst possible for one and all. For this reason they are known as “perverse rationales.” 283 An Empiric Source of Reflections: Some Hints I will not describe here the experiences that originated these reflections, but point out a constant I have detected in them, which is the tendency of all the participant actors to make use of energy in a direction that turns out to be a self-inflicted boycott of the collective project. It would be very interesting to measure empirically, that is to count and compare, the number of hours spent in playing a game of argument and counterargument regarding issues that have to do with spaces of political and personal power, and to compare that number with the number of hours spent fighting what is outside and pursuing common goals. We could do the same with the intensity and passion put into them. Thus economists and political scientists would be able to measure the cost-effectiveness of such efforts, exactly as they do in other areas of human activity. Of course, I am not seriously suggesting counting hours in this way, but the impression shared by many actors is that the hours lost in futile arguments and retaliation are excessively high in relation to the hours dedicated to the vital problems that trouble implicated actors. An abstract approach will call attention to a few clues that explain the self-boycott phenomenon. Firstly, these clues describe how the rationale of interaction among actors is established, how it impedes the achievement of collective goals, and how this rationale is difficult to escape. Within certain contexts, what is important is not the attitude of each actor, but the rationale that governs the interaction. The rationale implied in the interaction does not only have to do with the search for individual and common interests (an instrumental logic), but with a certain idea of the common good (a normative logic), and the idea of sincerity (a rationale of veracity or authenticity ), which, according to Habermas (), defines any type of social interaction. First Source of Analytic Reflections: GameTheory Game theory has a central characteristic that makes it as useful as it is limited: it simpli fies (“models”) human qualities, courses and alternatives of action, and decisions to the extreme. This is quite useful, since it allows us to schematically visualize the alternatives offered to the actors in a given situation (a “game”), and understand what they do, or predict what these actors will do when behaving “rationally,” which in this theory means pursuing their own interests. It is quite limited because rarely are actors perfectly aware of available alternatives, because courses of action do not often constitute clear and defined alternatives, and because admittedly, people hardly ever behave only “rationally,” if that is what “defending their own interests” means. When certain rationales—which this theory labels “perverse”—are installed, if actors (individuals or groups) pursue their own interests rationally, the results 284 / Mario Pecheny attained are not the best, either from the actor’s point of view or from that of the group. Basically, games formalize situations that have rewards and punishments, whose value is determined based on the interdependent or strategic decisions that actorsplayers make. That is, the results of the decisions and actions of each...