First Day at Gettysburg: Crisis at the Crossroads

17. Conclusion

CHAPTER 17 Conclusion "THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE," ASSERTS AN AUTHORITY ON GETTYSburg , Captain Joseph G. Rosengarten, "was ... indeed 'the soldier's battle,' for it was the fixed determination of the soldiers to hold the ground that counted far more than any skiIlful maneuvers of military art or the best tactical methods." 1 Yet, while this statement may well be true, in part at least, it does not mean that strategic and tactical leadership, especially on the part of the generals, was not of vital significance . If Napoleon's maxim, "In war, men are nothing, a man is everything," goes too far in elevating the role of the commander at the expense of the men in the ranks, it nonetheless does indicate the necessity of an army's possessing leaders of competence. The First Day's Battle of Gettysburg, July I, 1863, demonstrates in a manner that is crystal clear the magnificent fighting qualities of both the Union and Confederate soldiers in action, as well as the pivotal roles played by their commande:rs in shaping the fate of the combat. In the preliminary maneuvering of the two armies on the several days prior to July 1St, Lee seems to have had the edge over Meade. The gray chieftain, even though largely in ignorance of the precise whereabouts of the Federal army, stiIl managed to keep his various divisions fairly well in hand-cenainly better concentrated than were the scattered blue units. Meade allowed his forces to get too far apan, some units not being within supporting distance of others. Lee came within an ace, on July I, of achieving what he had planned when the Nationals were encountered: "I shall throw an overwhelming force on their advance, crush it, follow up the success, drive one corps back on another, and by successive repulses and surprises, before they can concentrate, create a panic and virtually destroy the anny." 2 It took, on the first day at Gettysburg, surpassing courage on the part of the Union troops, and inspired leadership by several of the Federal generals to prevent Lee's design from being realized. When the command of the Army of the Potomac was suddenly thrust upon Meade, his reaction to this heavy responsibility was sound though cautious. There was a paucity of information as to the locations of the enemy, and Meade had to feel his way northward. His selection and appointment of Reynolds to command the advance of the Left Wing, and the dispatching of Buford's cavalry to Gettysburg , were wise and soldierly decisions. On the other hand, if Lee had not wanted to bring on a general engagement while Longstreet was west of the South Mountains, the Southern leader should have kept a tighter rein on Hill and other subordinate commanders. Discretionary orders could easily be abused, as Jeb Stuart demonstrated in his illadvised , wide-sweeping circuit of the Union anny. Hill certainly erred, as evidenced by Lee's later painful surprise, in pennitting Heth to march on Gettysburg for forage and shoes. Hill should have urged Heth to be more circumspect in developing the situation in the event that Federal troops were present there in numbers. There can be only praise for Buford's and Reynolds' actions on the morning of July 1st. The former staunchly battled against heavy odds, seeing that he must make every possible effort to contain the Confederates until Reynolds could reinforce him with infantry. And Reynolds instantly perceived the need to hold the Southerners west and north of Gettysburg-regardless of the cost to his own and Howard's Eleventh Corps-long enough to give Meade time to concentrate his far-flung legions on the commanding Cemetery heights south of town. Upon the gallant Reynolds' death, Doubleday continued what the former was trying to accomplish, and, throughout the long hot day of fighting, did an outstanding tactical job in handling the First Corps so as to fulfill Reynolds' intentions. Each of Doubleday's division and brigade commanders-except possibly Rowley-perfonned creditably in this most trying situation. On the Confeder-ate side, in the initial clash, there was a certain looseness of command. Heth was too slow to commit his reserve brigades , once he had seen that Archer and Davis were in trouble. And 153 these two brigade leaders were careless in the handling of their units, with the result that both brigades were severely punished by Wadsworth . When...