The Command of the Air

Introduction

Introduction THE EDITOR of this review has opportunely intervened to make peace between the contestants. Like war on land, the discussion had become stabilized. The attackers repeated the same attacks, and the defender was forced in retaliation to repeat the same defensive arguments. The result was monotonous repetition which left the spectators cordially bored. But now a recapitulation of this long and bloodless war of words may be of some interest and utility-if for nothing else, to sum up the respective arguments as a basis for the renewal of the controversy at the proper time. Therefore, I have accepted the editor's courteous invitation to present an analysis of the discussion. I must ask indulgence if now and then I have to repeat myself, and not always as briefly as I could wish. My first affirmation of the importance of the aerial arm goes back to 1909, twenty years ago. Even then I stated definitely, with no reservations, that only the heavier-than air machines would solve the problem of human flight, especially in the military field; that the aerial arm was destined not to perform auxiliary actions to facilitate and integrate actions of land and sea forces, but to constitute an armed force, the third arm, parallel to, and of equal importance with, the land and sea forces; that the military plane should eventually have the capacity for combat in the air; and that the command of the air would soon be at least as valuable as the command of the sea. Since 1909 I have done nothing but repeat and amplify these fundamental assertions, always elated by the course of events, which indubitably has supported my original deductions. Follow- :Ul 212 Recapitulation ing this same line of thinking, in the first edition of The Command of the Air) which appeared in 1921, I tried to show the necessity of creating an independent aerial force instead of auxiliary ones-that is, forces dependent upon the arm to which they are attached-which I called Independent Air Force, able to perform acts of war with its own means. I tried also to show the necessity of giving this organization a status equal to the army and navy, and of putting its organization under an Air Ministry. At that time Italy was in a troubled and uncertain state, and my book was not given due consideration. It was, however, destined for the highest honor-namely, being put into execution. The National Government did in fact create first the Aeronautical Ministry and later the Independent Air Force. Thanks to no merit of mine, but to the enlightened thinking of the Head of the Government, the air arm has acquired a status equal to that of its sister arms, the land and sea arms. The Independent Air Force has been placed in a position parallel to the army and navy. The fact that the three military ministries were united under the Head of the Government, and that the rank of Chief of the General Staff was created, defined and perfected the central organization of our armed power. Thus the most important step had been taken in regard to the air arm, and at last the Independent Air Force could show clearly what it was worth. Though the fundamental concept of an Independent Air Force was clear and definite, there was still a great deal of vagueness and confusion about it in the minds of the people in general. An Independent Air Force? What for? What is it supposed to do, and how will it work? What is it worth? There was nothing for me to do in answer but to amplify in more detail the ideas I had already expressed ~n The Command of the Air. At that time I had explicitly stated that the conquest of the command of the air is absolutely necessary for victory. A logical corollary of that idea is that it is essential to be prepared for the conquest of the air, and that therefore most of our aerial forces ought to be concentrated into the Independent Air Force, the organization designed for the conquest of the air. To concentrate is the opposite of to disperse. So, taking one Recapitulation more step, in Part II of The Command of the Air~ added in the edition of 1927, I affirmed the necessity of concentrating all available aerial forces into an Independent Air Force designed to sustain the struggle of which the final objective is the command of the...