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6. Gunpowder and Port Ebullient and self-righteous as ever, Johnstone landed in England toward the end of October 1778, his estimate of himself undimmed by the complete failure ofhis dubious diplomatic methods. To a surprising extent this opinion was shared by others. His fellow commissioners in America wrote that only Johnstone's "Strict Sense of Honour" had caused him to leave them, and they bemoaned his departure. If the diplomatic horizon brightened, they did not know how they would cope without "the Advantage of Mr. Johnstone's Abilities and the Authority of His Name."1 They consoled themselves with the reflection , and no irony appears intended, that the ministry would have the benefit of his expertise.2 Reporting to Germain on debarkation Johnstone found that he was not in disgrace with the administration either. Instead of berating him, the American secretary seemed relieved that Johnstone was "seemingly in good humour with the Ministry."3 To the public he claimed, and was evidently believed, that he had done more to secure victory than any use of force had achieved, by sowing the seeds of enmity to Congress among the American populace.4 The English public had already been treated to another version of the commissioner's work. An anonymous ode had charged that the earl of Bute dominated the peace delegation, that Eden alone of its members was in his confidence and that the one-time favorite, with byzantine cunning and for his own ends, had intended that Johnstone and Eden should fall out and that the commission should fail. Eden was charg'd with all B-te's Store of Secrets-Colleagues were no more Than Cyphers in the Case.s Any readers prepared to accept this farfetched analysis ofthe commission, which, incidentally, accepted as fact the unfounded rumor ofEden's quarrel with Johnstone, would presumably also be ready to exonerate Johnstone as a mere dupe. Shortly after the governor's arrival, the young marquess of Granby, a noble Opposition sprig, wrote to him, assuring him of undiminished "attachment and sincere friendship."6 Immediately before the peace commission had been mooted, Johnstone had tried to tie Granby into a political combination with Chatham, Shelburne, and Rockingham.7 By October of 1778 that alliance was impossible, but it did not seem to have occurred to Granby that Johnstone might have veered away from Opposition. For some time, indeed, Johnstone's political stance was to remain ambiguous . On November 26, he delivered a long apologia for the work ofthe peace commission in the House of Commons. Quite characteristically he defended by attacking and blamed the failure of negotiations on three 130 Gunpowder and Port culprits. The first was Congress, which had conducted itself"with the low Cunning of an election jobber" at a time when two-thirds of the people it was supposed to represent, or so Johnstone alleged, wanted to resume the connection with England. The Howe brothers were also culpable, he said, because they were responsible for the sad military situation which had weakened the commission's prospects. Finally, the North administration had contributed to that situation by its extraordinary dilatoriness in maintaining British naval strength on the North American station. As for himself, said Johnstone, he had tried to bribe nobody, although, he added obscurely, "I do not mean to disavow I have had transactions where other means than persuasion have been used. It was necessary: in my situation it can be no reproach."8 The Opposition was divided in its opinion of the commission. John Wilkes condemned the other commissioners, but Johnstone, he said, "possessed a superior understanding, an happy temper, and thorough knowledge of business. If success had been attainable, I am persuaded, to his wisdom, prudence, and temperate conduct, England had been indebted for the restoration of the blessings of peace." Carlisle, by contrast, he derided as a playboy who had taken with him "a group of little laughing loves," while he characterized Eden as "distinguished by a set of principles wonderfully adapted to the spirit of coercion and cruelty."9 This last charge was ironical in view of a speech made by the "temperate " Johnstone a few days later, in which the savage proclamation issued by the commissioners on October 3 was discussed. It certainly did mean a war ofdesolation, said Johnstone. It could mean nothing else; and ifhe had been on the spot he would have signed it. He was not saying so as a convert to administration policy, since, he declared, he...

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