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Already in the spring of 1950, there were intelligence reports coming to the Far East Command in Tokyo regarding major troop concentrations north of the 38th parallel in Korea and evacuation of civilians from that area. For a considerable period of time prior to these reports, there had been border clashes between forces of the North and South Korean armies, which appear to have been seen as sources of tension rather than immediate concern. They seem to have been evaluated on the background of current Weltpolitik, rather than on the actualities on the ground. Seen from the perspective of North Korea acting as a puppet of Soviet international policy, intelligence analysis in Tokyo did not indicate that this was a convenient time for an aggressive move against the South. Thus, no alarm was raised. Indeed, on June 25, 1950, a large number of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) were on weekend leave, most of the important of¤cials in Washington were out of the city, and General Douglas MacArthur was incredulous when the North Korea People’s Army crossed into South Korea. The attack occurred all along the waist of the peninsula, with the main assault carried out by two infantry divisions and an armored brigade. First, the Ongjin Peninsula in the west was hit. This was followed by strikes at Kaesong, which stood before the capital, Seoul, and soon thereafter by aggressive moves farther to the east, at Chunchon. Seoul was being attacked almost simultaneously by air. The ROK army was represented by only four regiments on the line at the onset of the thrusts, and although there was a brief attempt at counterattack by the ROK Seventh Division, the latter was, as was to hap3 Invasion Invasion, June 25, 1950. pen all too often in this con®ict, soon left vulnerable by the collapse of its®anking division, forcing it to withdraw. This left the way open to Seoul, which ¤nally fell to the enemy on the fourth day of the invasion. There was tremendous confusion and disarray in Seoul. Members of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) evacuated, as did thousands of others, but ultimately, the bridges across the Han River below Seoul were blown, taking hundreds of Koreans to oblivion and leaving thousands stranded on the north side. Although having failed to anticipate the attack, the government of the United States, in spite of the poor state of military preparedness in which it had left the South Koreans on its original withdrawal, did not intend to preside over the demise of the new state. Aside from the moral issue, it was considered imperative that the leader of the democracies of the world draw a line against what was regarded as pure, international Communist imperialism, albeit with the keen recognition that if the Soviet Union challenged this decision militarily, there could be a most unpleasant consequence. The Soviets had by no means followed the example of the West in a frantic demobilization after World War II and would not even lag in nuclear war technology for long. Nevertheless, the United States, with the Soviet Union boycotting the U.N. Security Council, acquired from the United Nations two resolutions supporting immediate intervention. The ¤rst, on June 25, called for the withdrawal of North Korean troops from South Korea. The second, on June 27, asked for the members of the United Nations to aid the South Koreans in their defense against the aggression from the North. This effectively placed the prosecution of the military effort under the leadership of the United States. The ¤rst active response was to send immediate aid to the South Koreans in the form of military supplies and equipment, without the dispatch of combat troops. The rapidity with which this was recognized as totally inadequate re®ects the combination of skepticism relative to the capabilities of the South Korean units on their own and cognizance of the actual menace of the swiftly advancing North Koreans. Particularly effective on behalf of the enemy was his armor. The Russian T-34 tanks were a terrifying weapon in the eyes of the South Koreans and, indeed, in the view of the ¤rst American troops to face them in Korea, for there were no comparable tanks available to them at the time with which to counter them. The U.N. side did not even have effective antitank weapons. By June 30, it was abundantly clear that not only active participation by Invasion / 17 air and...

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